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About this report
This guide is primarily an expert
analysis of the electoral and political
effects of the scheme proposed by the
Independent Commission on the Vot-
ing System (the Jenkins Commission)
for elections to the House of Com-
mons. It compares the Jenkins
scheme, known as AV-Plus, with the
current ‘first past the post’ electoral
system, because the Commission’s
home-grown scheme, known as AV-
Plus, will be put to the public as an
alternative to first past the post elec-
tions in a referendum.
The new scheme could not be in-
troduced until after the next election.
The government has not yet an-
nounced the date of the referendum,
but Lord Jenkins has indicated that
he would regard it as a ‘betrayal’ if it
were delayed until after the next gen-
eral election.
This guide is based on research
undertaken by Patrick Dunleavy and
Helen Margetts for the Jenkins Com-
mission; previous research on the
1992 and 1997 general elections; and
a special study of mixed voting sys-
tems. These previous studies were
variously commissioned and funded
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Council, and the Joseph Rowntree
Charitable Trust.
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INTRODUCTION
On 29 October 1998, the Independent Commission onthe Voting System (the
Jenkins Commission) proposed radi-
cal change in the way Britain elects
the House of Commons. The Commis-
sion, chaired by Lord Jenkins of
Hillhead, recommended a two-vote
mixed electoral system, AV-Plus, as
the best alternative for Britain to the
current ‘first past the post’ (FPTP), or
plurality-rule, system for general elec-
tions. This ‘home-made’ system,
AV-Plus, was designed to meet the
four criteria laid down for the Com-
mission by the government – that the
alternative system they recommended
should offer greater voter choice, de-
liver stable government, maintain the
link between MPs and local constitu-
encies, and produce broadly
proportional results.
The Commission’s AV-Plus scheme
belongs to the broad family of mixed
electoral systems, generally known as
additional member systems (AMS),
but has been designed to build on fea-
tures of the existing FPTP system and
British political culture. In particular,
to keep strong local links and make it
possible for the larger political parties
still to win a working majority of seats
in the House of Commons on a mi-
nority of the popular vote. This
objective is dictated in part by the
aversion to coalition government
which is a significant element in Brit-
ain’s political culture. Indeed, the
Commission specifically says that it
does not wish to impose ‘a coalition
habit’ on the country.
This report analyses the major fea-
tures of the AV-Plus system which the
Commission has recommended
should be put to the British public in
a referendum as an alternative to first
past the post voting. We compare AV-
Plus with first past the post, but not
with standard alternative voting sys-
tems (for which see our previous
writings); show how AV-Plus would
have worked in 1992 and 1997 in
some detail, including the degree of
distortion in its results; and provide a
broad assessment of its likely electoral
effects.
Jenkins in a nutshell
Under the Commission’s scheme, AV-
Plus, most MPs – 80 to 85 per cent –
would continue to be elected in local
constituencies, which would be rather
larger than now. Electors would cast
their first vote for a constituency can-
didate under the alternative vote (AV)
system, not FPTP as in the AMS
schemes for Scotland, Wales and the
London Assembly (as well as AMS
systems abroad). Under AV, voters
number the candidates in order of
preference on their ballot papers. If a
candidate gets a majority of first-pref-
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erence votes, he or she is elected. Oth-
erwise, the bottom-placed candidate
is eliminated and his or her second-
preference votes are distributed
among the other candidates, and this
process continues from the bottom up
until one candidate secures a simple
majority of votes.
In addition, electors would cast a
second ‘party’ vote for some 98 to 132
top-up MPs (15 to 20 per cent of the
total in the House of Commons). The
Commission leaves open exactly what
the final proportion of top-up MPs to
local members should be. The pur-
pose of the additional layer of MPs is
to reduce the inevitable dis-
proportionality of the local election
results. The more to-up MPs there are,
the more accurately the composition
of the House of Commons would re-
flect voters’ wishes; the ‘classic’ AMS
scheme has equal numbers of local
and top-up MPs and achieves close
to pure proportionality. At the same
time, there would be fewer local MPs
serving larger constituencies if the
size of the Commons is held constant
(as Jenkins intends it should be).
Under Jenkins, the top-up MPs
would not be elected nationally or
regionally, as under most proportional
representation (PR) systems, but from
counties and equivalent-sized metro-
politan districts in England, Scottish
and Welsh Euro-constituency areas,
and two top-up areas in Northern Ire-
land. There would be 80 top-up areas
in total – 65 in England, eight in Scot-
land, five in Wales and two in
Northern Ireland. Of these areas, 44
would have a single top-up MP and
the remaining 36 – in London, cen-
tral Scotland and large metropolitan
areas, as well as the two Northern Ire-
land areas – would each elect two
top-up MPs.
The choice of locally identifiable
top-up areas is a significant innova-
tion. It is designed both to reduce
central party control of the choice of
candidates and their place on the
party lists, and to provide both local
accountability and a broad local link
for top-up MPs.
Local AV elections, plus the correc-
tive top-up mechanism, will, the
Commission argues, substantially in-
crease voter choice. Voting under AV
for local candidates frees voters from
having to face the ‘tactical vote’ choice
between their first-preference candi-
date or party and the most acceptable
of the candidates likely to win the seat.
They can vote in order of preference,
knowing that their second and third
preference votes may still count if
their first-preference candidate is
knocked out. The second party vote
also helps voters to avoid the same sort
of dilemma. The Commission also in-
sists that party lists in the second
ballot should be ‘open’, not ‘closed’,
thus giving voters the choice of either
a straight party vote or a vote for a
specific individual candidate on the
list.
The Commission’s report states
that elections by the alternative vote
will ensure that all constituency mem-
bers have majority support in their
constituencies – which is not now the
case with over 40 per cent of existing
MPs. However, there are major objec-
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tions to their choice. First, AV can pro-
duce considerably more dispro-
portional results than FPTP, as indeed
it would have done had it been in use
alone in 1997. Secondly, critics – who
include Lord Alexander, a Commis-
sion member – object that it gives too
much weight to ‘lower grade’ second,
third and perhaps further choices.
The Commission also makes an
important recommendation on one
cause of bias in current electoral ar-
rangements. Strictly speaking, it
would be possible to achieve some
sort of parity between voters in differ-
ent constituencies if they were all of a
broadly equal size. But the UK has
four Boundary Commissions, one for
each of the ‘home countries’ and they
apply quite different ‘electoral quotas’
to determine the size of constituen-
cies; and Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland are all entitled to a
minimum number of constituencies –
which for instance means that Scot-
land’s quota is 20 per cent lower than
that for English constituencies. These
inequalities make for greater dispro-
portion in election results.
The government has already de-
cided that the Scottish Commission
will be able to ignore the quota for
Scotland. To reduce bias, the Jenkins
Commission recommends that there
should be a single electoral quota for
the UK as a whole. The Commission
also proposes that, as far as possible,
the ratio of constituency to top-up
MPs should be equal in the four na-
tions of the United Kingdom.
The Commission makes several
other major proposals, including the
establishment of a new independent
Electoral Commission, to oversee
electoral administration and referen-
dums. It accepts that AV-Plus could
not be introduced until after the next
election and recommends that if the
scheme is put in place, it should be
reviewed only after two elections have
taken place and that any fundamen-
tal change, such as a change in the
ratio of top-up MPs to local members
or a return to FPTP, should not be in-
troduced without a further
referendum.
Overall, the Commission has given
priority to two main element of the
existing system – locally-based MPs
and single-party government – over
the criterion of ‘broad proportionality’
while extending voter choice. This
priority is evident in the Commission’s
own summary:
‘Our recommendation would have
produced single party majority Gov-
ernment in three out of the last four
elections, with the only exception
[1992] being a parliament which, even
under the old system, exhibited many
of the features of uncertain command.
It is therefore difficult to argue that
whet we propose is a recipe either for
a predominance of coalitions or for
producing a weakness of government
authority . . . .’
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FIRST PAST THE POST
As the public will be invited tochoose between AV-Plus andthe existing system in the
proposed referendum, it is important
to discuss and analyse the strengths
and weaknesses of first past the post
(FPTP) elections, or the plurality-rule
system (to use the correct name).
A primary duty of any electoral sys-
tem is that it should represent the
votes – or wishes – of the electorate as
effectively as possible. The key criti-
cism of plurality-rule in Britain is that
the shares of seats in the House of
Commons which the political parties
receive are quite different from their
shares of the popular vote in general
elections. Further, the relationship
between seat shares and vote shares
changes markedly from one election
to the next. It is often said that the
results are unfair between parties –
some parties get large returns in seats
for relatively few votes, others may
collect a significant overall vote, but
receive very few seats at all.  But as
the Jenkins report states, ‘the major
“unfairness” count against FPTP is
that it distorts the desires of voters’
(para 6).
Deviation from proportionality in
1992 and 1997
In institutional terms, the British sys-
tem is not ‘proportional’. But how
exactly should we measure ‘propor-
tionality’? Political scientists have
developed many different possible
indicators of electoral system perform-
ance, but serious comparative work on
electoral systems has tended to focus
on the concept of ‘deviation from pro-
portionality’. Table 1 shows how we
calculated deviation from proportion-
ality (DV) in the 1997 general election
in Great Britain. (We exclude North-
ern Ireland here because it has a quite
separate party system.)
Table 1: Deviation from proportionality in
the 1997 election
Party % votes % seats deviations
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Conservatives 31.4 25.7 – 5.7
Labour 44.4 65.4 + 21.0
Liberal Democrat 17.2 7.2 – 10.0
Scottish National Party 2.0 0.9 – 1.1
Plaid Cymru 0.5 0.6 + 0.1
Referendum Party 2.7 0 – 2.7
Others 1.7 0.2 – 1.5
Total 100 100
Total deviations (ignoring + or – signs) 42.1
DV score = total deviations/2 21%
Largest deviation (for Labour) 21%
We simply subtract the percentage
of seats a party gained in the Com-
mons from its percentage vote share
to give a deviation for each party.
Then we add up the deviations for all
parties (discarding their plus or mi-
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nus signs, which would otherwise
mean that they cancel each other out)
and divide by 2. This gives a devia-
tion from proportionality (DV) score
of 21 per cent for the 1997 general
election.
This figure can be simply under-
stood as the fraction of MPs who are
not entitled to their seats in the legis-
lature in terms of their party’s national
share of the vote. Under a pure pro-
portional representation system, then,
over one fifth of seats would switch to
a different party – a score which has
been much the same in most elections
since the mid-1970s, when substan-
tial Liberal and other third party
voting became an established feature
of British politics. The DV score for
the 1997 Labour landslide is slightly
below the 1983 deviation from propor-
tionality score of 23 per cent, when
Margaret Thatcher won a large ma-
jority over Michael Foot’s divided
Labour party.
The almost unique feature in Ta-
ble 1, however, is that Labour’s gains
(its huge ‘winner’s bias’) did not come
solely from third parties, but in large
part also from the under-representa-
tion of the Conservatives – only the
third time since 1918 that they have
obtained fewer seats than their share
of the votes, the other occasions be-
ing in 1945 and (marginally) in 1966.
The Liberal Democrats were the most
under-represented party in 1997, but
in fact they did relatively well by com-
parison with the past. In most
elections since 1970, the party has
achieved only 3 per cent of seats,
whatever its share of the vote – even
when, as the Liberal-Social Democrat
Alliance, it gained 26 per cent sup-
port in 1983.
The British deviation from propor-
tionality score has been among the
largest recorded amongst liberal de-
mocracies for the last 25 years. In
western Europe, proportional repre-
sentation systems commonly achieve
scores of 4-8 per cent – a level only
briefly recorded in Britain during the
two-party era of the 1950s. Similarly
in the USA, where there is a perfect
two-party system in Congressional
elections, the deviation from propor-
tionality is very stable at around 7 per
cent. So the British system is broadly
three times worse at translating votes
into seats accurately than the main
countries against which we tend to
measure our democracy. The major
countries which still achieve high
deviation scores like Britain’s are
former imperial territories which re-
tain plurality-rule elections, especially
Canada, Malaysia and India.
However, even the deviation from
proportionality score for Britain as a
whole does not tell the whole story.
This figure is almost always mislead-
ingly low if compared with other
countries, because areas of pro-Con-
servative deviation in the south-east
are partly offset by areas of pro-La-
bour deviation in Scotland and the
north. In 1992, the national DV score
was just 17.4 per cent, but far higher
scores than this were common in most
regions. Across south-east England
the Conservatives won 97 per cent of
seats in 1992 on the basis of 55 per
cent of the votes (leaving all other
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parties virtually unrepresented). So
the deviation from proportionality in
the south-east was 43 per cent – just
about as high as it is possible to get
inside a liberal democracy (see 1992
map). In 1997, the DV score was
higher than the national level of 21
per cent in 12 of 18 regions (see 1997
map). In central Scotland, another
very high DV score (42 per cent) re-
flected the Labour party ’s unfair
political domination (although with
fewer seats at stake than in south-east
England).
Thus British voters experience an
electoral system which is far more
unfair than the national figure would
suggest – on average, the votes of
more than one in four voters (28 per
cent) did not count in 1992 when it
came to the allocation of seats in the
House of Commons. In 1997, the ero-
sion in Conservative voting and the
Liberal Democrat breakthrough in
south-west England reduced high DV
scores in critical southern areas where
there is a large number of seats, but
still nearly one in four voters (23 per
cent) found that the electoral system
ignored their votes in allocating seats.
Only in south-west England did first
past the post deliver reasonably pro-
portional results – a surprising
outcome given the fairly even three-
way split of votes in that region in
1997.
Electoral deserts
Scrutiny of regional voting patterns
in 1997 reveals one major element in
the poor electoral performance of the
Conservatives. Overall, their vote
slumped from 43 per cent in 1992 to
just over 31 per cent – and the plural-
ity-rule system tends to discriminate
heavily against parties whose support
falls below about a third. In 11 out of
the 18 regions we used in our 1997
election analysis, the Conservatives
fell badly below the 33 per cent mark,
and they were ahead of Labour in only
three regions (south-east and south-
west England and East Anglia).
A further sign of their crisis was the
growth of regions where the Con-
servatives gained no MPs at all (as in
Scotland and Wales) or hardly any
MPs (as in all the great urban areas
of England).  For the Jenkins report,
these ‘electoral deserts’ represent a
major failing of first past the post elec-
tions. The report points out that
Labour experienced a similar fate in
the 1980s, being excluded from the
more rapidly growing and prosperous
southern half of the UK. South of a
line from the Wash to the Severn es-
tuary, there were only three Labour
seats outside London in both 1983 and
1987; and no predominantly rural
constituencies in England elected a
Labour MP. The report is highly criti-
cal of the ‘geographically divisive’
effects of FPTP, commenting that ‘such
apartheid in electoral outcome is a
heavy count against the system which
produces it. It is a new form of
Disraeli’s two nations’ (para 31).
It is the same properties of FPTP
which tend to make it hard to allow
third party support to express itself.
As we have shown, the rise in elec-
toral support for the Liberals and their
successor parties which has de-stabi-
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lised plurality-rule elections since the
1970s has not been rewarded with an
equal rise in their representation in
Parliament. Plurality-rule elections
work in two-party political systems,
as in the USA, but Britain has now
ceased to be a two-party system. By
1974, the low Liberal shares of the
vote common in the 1950s heyday of
two-party politics had grown to nearly
20 per cent of the popular vote, but
the Liberals still won only 2.2 per cent
of the seats in the House of Commons.
In 1983, the Alliance got only 3.5 per
cent of the seats after winning 26 per
cent of the vote. Even in 1997, with
all the benefit of tactical voting, it still
got only 7 per cent of the seats for
nearly 17 per cent of the vote (see Ta-
ble 1).
The virtues and vices of FPTP
The Jenkins report seeks to summa-
rise the virtues and vices of the
plurality-rule system. The report lists
its virtues as follows:
l It is said to be familiar and simple
to use.
l It gives each MP a direct relation-
ship with a particular geographical
area and encourages them to try to
serve all their constituents well, how-
ever partisan they may be at
Westminster.
l It usually (though not invariably)
leads to single-party government and
this outcome may be seen as assist-
ing quick decisions and sustained
policy lines.
l It enables the electorate sharply
and cleanly to rid itself of an un-
wanted government.
l It offers unorthodox MPs a degree
of independence from excessive party
control, provided (as many do) that
they can retain the support of their
local party.
Its deficiencies (or vices) derive,
the report states, from its natural ten-
dency to disunite rather than to unite
the country. The report lists the fol-
lowing vices:
l FPTP exaggerates movements of
opinion and, when they are strong,
produces mammoth majorities in the
House of Commons (for Labour in
1945, 1966 and 1997; for the Tories,
in 1959, 1983 and 1987). Landslide
majorities do not, in general, conduce
to the effective working of the House
of Commons.
l Recent large majorities have been
secured with smaller percentages of
the popular vote in 1987 and 1997
than in the 1940s and 1950s, largely
because third parties have taken
larger shares of the vote.
l Third parties are however grossly
under-represented in Parliament un-
less they have a relatively narrow
focus, like Plaid Cymru and (less
markedly) the SNP. Thus perversely,
third parties with a broader appeal –
a ‘favourable factor from the point of
view of national cohesion’ – are heav-
ily discouraged.
l FPTP creates ‘electoral deserts’ (see
above).
l FPTP narrows the terrain over
which the political battle is fought, by
creating an essential election contest
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in about 100-150 marginal in normal
circumstances. Many voters in ‘safe’
seats may thus pass their entire adult
lives without ever voting for a winning
candidate or even influencing a result.
This has a knock-on effect on turnout
at elections.
l At local level MPs are increasingly
returned to Westminster on a minor-
ity vote. In the 1950s, some 14 per cent
of MPs won their seats on less than
50 per cent of the local vote. In the
two 1990s elections, the figure has
risen to 44 per cent – nearly half of all
MPs.
l There is ‘some, but not overwhelm-
ingly strong evidence’ that FPTP is
less good at producing parliamentary
representation for women and for eth-
nic minorities than are most
proportional systems.
The perverse effects of FPTP are
proliferating fast (see Political Power
and Democratic Control in Britain,
Stuart Weir and David Beetham,
Routledge 1998, pp. 54-5). The
Jenkins report cites two – in 1951,
Labour lost the election even though
they out-polled the Conservatives and
actually won a majority of the popu-
lar vote; in February 1974, the
Conservatives won most votes but
Labour took power with more seats.
The Jenkins arguments in
perspective
The Jenkins report is clearly anxious
to appease pro-FPTP sentiment in its
summary of the system’s virtues and
vices, while concluding that the case
for it has to be tested against a very
substantial list of deficiencies.  This
approach underpins its essential case
for AV-Plus – which is presented as a
compromise between FPTP and a
more pluralist and proportional alter-
native. The compromise approach is
built into the very criteria which
framed the Commission’s inquiries:
the criteria of ‘stable government’ and
the ‘constituency link’ serve as a po-
litical code for the current system; and
‘voter choice’ and ‘broadly propor-
tional’ for more pluralist systems.
But the Commission’s attempt to
provide a balance of argument for and
against plurality-rule means that the
report fails to subject the virtues which
it lists to thorough analysis – though
they are noted elsewhere in passing
– and curiously understates the ma-
jor structural fault of FPTP under
contemporary British conditions. This
fault renders it unfit for further serv-
ice. As we shall argue, like the royal
yacht Britannia, our electoral system
is obsolete.
First, the MP’s constituency link.
There is no doubt about the huge in-
crease in correspondence between
MPs and their constituents, both over
political issues nationally and locally,
and constituents’ own problems. But
the closeness of the MP-constituency
link is usually exaggerated and the
Jenkins report tends to take it at face
value. Opinion polls suggest, for ex-
ample, that only about half the
population can name their MP and a
major study, published in 1992, found
that only about one in ten people had
contacted their MP in the previous
five years. Considerably more people
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take their problems to local council-
lors.  Further, the idea that MPs are
dependent on their constituents rather
than on their parties is a political
myth. Party loyalty by MPs to their
party, in government or opposition, is
the keystone of their political role and
determines all or most of their con-
duct.
The role of MPs as ‘problem-solv-
ers’ has not been closely studied. It is
not known whether they provide an
effective service to the minority of
people who approach them. But it is
almost certainly patchy, and probably
less effective than that which ex-
panded and more accessible
Ombudsman services, as well as a
well-resourced network of Citizen’s
Advice Bureaus, could provide.
There are other considerations too
which arise from confusions about the
indeterminate role of MPs. The evi-
dence is that backbench MPs are
grossly over-stretched and many turn
to ‘constituency work’ as a tangible
satisfaction in a badly-defined and
often frustrating career. Former La-
bour MP John Garrett suggests that
whips, ministers and civil servants
encourage MPs to act as local advo-
cates because they know that
constituency overload can drive out
persistent scrutiny; and critics of the
Commons, such as Kate Jenkins, are
scornful anyway about the ability of
MPs properly to perform their duty to
make the executive accountable.
Finally, the advent of devolved gov-
ernment in London, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland, and at least the
prospect of regional government in
England means that the local and wel-
fare roles of MPs is set to diminish.
None of this is meant to deny the
value of a local link for MPs, but sim-
ply to warn against giving it undue
prominence and to signal the need to
ensure that MPs perform their wider
duties more effectively. Here Jenkins
does usefully suggest that top-up MPs
might take a greater interest in the
scrutiny of legislation, which is noto-
riously badly performed by existing
constituency MPs.
The Jenkins report does question
the idea that single-party government
is the traditional norm in British poli-
tics and considers evidence from a few
chosen countries, notably Ireland and
Germany, which can be shown to have
achieved stable government and no-
table economic growth in the postwar
period. So far as tradition is con-
cerned, the report points out that for
43 of the past 150 years, Britain has
been governed by overt coalitions; for
another 34 years the government of
the day depended on the votes of one
or more other parties; and for another
nine a government technically hold-
ing an overall majority actually had
an uncertain command over the
House, the most recent example be-
ing John Major ’s 1992-97
government.  Thus, for more than half
of this period, Britain has not been
ruled by the traditionally strong sin-
gle-party government which FPTP
seeks to produce; and the Commis-
sion argues that British history shows
that single-party government is not a
necessary prerequisite for effective
action.
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However, the report fails to chal-
lenge the strongly-held idea that
coalition government is necessarily
weaker and less desirable than single-
party government, to subject it to
rigorous analysis, and to review the
experience of coalition government in
more than a few western democracies.
We briefly do so in the next section of
this report.
There are two further weaknesses
in the Jenkins approach. The first is
that, by default, it does not fully ex-
amine the claim that is often made
that the British electorate has direct
control over the process of forming
governments in the United Kingdom,
and endorses the view that the elec-
toral system ‘enables the electorate
sharply and cleanly to rid itself of an
unwanted government’.  The weak-
ness of both claims is that the
‘electorate’ evidently does no such
thing. Certainly voters do have a di-
rect say in the formation and dismissal
of governments, but it is a minority of
voters which performs the first func-
tion, and a government can continue
in office against the wishes of the
majority at election after election. The
‘electorate’ is a political phantom. On
the only occasion on which a major-
ity of the electorate voted in postwar
Britain for a particular party to hold
power, in 1951, that party lost the elec-
tion and the party with fewer votes
was returned to power. Could it really
be said with any degree of truth or
logic that the ‘electorate’ had spoken?
Thereafter every government has
been elected on a minority of the
popular vote: so it is a minority of the
electorate that actually makes – and
unmakes – governments in the UK.
Mrs Thatcher ’s governments in the
1980s, all-powerful politically, were all
returned on minority votes of some-
thing over 40 per cent in turn, and
‘unwanted’ by nearly 60 per cent of
the electorate.  The fact is that that
the desires of the electorate are dis-
torted in the first instance by the
unrepresentative nature of the results
of the electoral system itself, and then
further distorted by the supreme
power which the political system con-
fers upon the leading party (or not)
once it has won its majority.
Finally, it ought to be acknowl-
edged, as US politics constantly
reminds us, that first-past- the-post
elections can deliver very reasonably
proportional results time after time. In
the United States, only 7 per cent of
members of the House of Representa-
tives are elected for parties who are
not entitled to their seats in terms of
their share of the national vote (com-
parable to the best European PR
systems, which hit between 4-8% on
the same ‘deviation from proportion-
ality ’ score). And virtually all US
Representatives enjoy clear majority
support in their districts. But the USA
is the only large country where first-
past-the-post elections work in this
way, because it is the only perfect two-
party system in the world. Everywhere
else in liberal democracies party sup-
port is fragmenting over time, and
first-past-the-post elections cannot
cope.
In Canada the system is now dan-
gerously erratic, projecting the
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Conservatives at the last election from
having a Parliamentary majority to
holding just three seats. In India first-
past-the-post means that party seat
shares also yo-yo dramatically with
small shifts in votes, and enormous
local and regional corruption has
been stimulated by the strong elec-
toral insulation of MPs. In Malaysia
the system supports a regime where
executive power has become unsta-
ble and civil rights are in jeopardy.
And these are now the only substan-
tial countries that still use the British
system.
In Britain, as we have seen, the
disproportionality score is commonly
three times higher than in the USA;
and only just over half of all MPs en-
joy majority support from their
constituents. These are poor levels of
electoral legitimacy. But there is a
strong structural reason for these ma-
jor deficiencies. Since 1972,
thousands of opinion polls, 26 years
of municipal elections, four Euro-
elections, and seven successive
general elections have shown one fifth
or more of the vote going to third and
fourth parties – to the Liberal Demo-
crats, to the SNP in Scotland and
Plaid Cymru in Wales, or to the
Greens (notably in the 1989 Euro elec-
tions). In 1997, a record-breaking 4.4
per cent of the vote even went to fifth
and sixth parties (such as the Refer-
endum Party and the UK
Independence Party). And in North-
ern Ireland, the previous umbilical
connection to the mainland party sys-
tem has been completely severed: in
the PR 1998 Assembly elections 12
parties obtained significant vote
shares.
Most media commentators and
many academics are blind to the new
structure of British politics. In their
minds politics is still a two-party af-
fair. Like first-past-the-post itself, they
treat all the voters for third parties
with contempt. Liberal Democrat ar-
guments for fairness for their voters
and party are dismissed as special
pleading. But they will have to open
their eyes and minds sooner rather
than later. For the former Roy
Jenkins’s ‘mould’ really is broken. The
structural changes which prevent the
system from more accurately reflect-
ing the choices that people actually
make are not going to go away. The
consistent voting patterns and trends
of the last 28 years will not suddenly
go into reverse. We live in a post-mod-
ern age, and the former two-party
politics of Britain will go on being frac-
tured – indeed, the fracturing will take
worse forms if voting reform is de-
layed. If the electoral system stays
unchanged, it can only be a matter of
a few years after 2001 before the pro-
portionally elected Scottish
Parliament will so dominate electoral
legitimacy in Scotland that the Com-
mons is reduced to a farce in Scottish
eyes, and the ratchet for Scottish in-
dependence will take a further
powerful turn.
In the last 15 years Britain has be-
come a more middle class society;
years in school have lengthened; and
the numbers of graduates have soared
– all factors that used to predict
greater election turnout. But overall
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turnout has stubbornly not increased
– instead it plunged in the 1997 gen-
eral election by six percentage points
to a postwar low. Voting in the 1998
municipal elections fell back by a
staggering 10 to 15 percentage points
right across the country, and dramati-
cally in Labour heartlands. The
underlying propensity to vote in Brit-
ain is in decline, with serious effects
in inner-city areas. Turnout level will
not easily be rebuilt, and could all too
easily spiral further downwards.
Jenkins identifies the elements of the
structural causes of the higher levels
of distortion in Britain’s elections to
Parliament, but fails explicitly to nail
his significant proposals for reform to
a structural shift in British politics
which will not fade away.
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COALITION
GOVERNMENT
Here we briefly review thegeneral state of knowledgeabout single party and coa-
lition government, focusing on the
arguments that coalition governments
deprive electors of effective choice of
and control over government and are
less effective than single-party gov-
ernments.  The trouble is that debate
in Britain assumes that there is a sharp
distinction between single party and
coalition governments; and that pro-
portional representation and coalition
government are a uniform political
phenomenon. Thus, opponents of PR
can argue both that coalition govern-
ments are inherently unstable (citing
Italy) and too stable (citing Germany).
The fact is that there are many differ-
ent kinds of coalition in western
Europe alone.  Some are more effec-
tive than others. Some emerge clearly
from electoral verdicts, others do not.
There are general truths about
most proportional systems. By their
very nature, they generally reflect the
wishes of voters far more accurately
than the British system does; and
those systems which employ party
lists do generally give central party
organisations a greater degree of con-
trol over the selection of candidates
than is considered appropriate in the
United Kingdom. But different sys-
tems produce different results and in
this brief review we will concentrate
on electoral and political effects which
are relevant to the Jenkins choice, AV-
Plus, which is for example deliberately
designed to minimise central party
control over the choice of candidates.
The idea of the party mandate
A major justification for FPTP in Brit-
ain is that single-party governments,
even though elected on a minority
vote, can deliver on the programmes
that they put to the electorate because
their artificial majority in the House
gives them the power to deliver on
their mandate. The party mandate
thus offers a mechanism for linking
electoral preferences to government
action through the central party role
in both. We should note the positive
side of mandate arrangements, even
when they do rest on a plurality rather
than a majority of the vote. They have
two interrelated strengths:
l electors know what they are voting
for and can cast their vote so as to
enhance the chance of their preferred
party forming the government and
carrying through its programme
l the election result does secure the
electoral choice of at least the largest
minority among the electorate.
However, the mandate idea under
FPTP involves often unexamined de-
ficiencies. The full operation of the
mandate really demands that Parlia-
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ment be totally subordinate to the gov-
ernment formed by the majority party.
All opposition parties can or should
do is try to rally popular support for
alternative programmes in light of the
next election. Attempts to give Parlia-
ment real powers of investigation or
control subvert the idea of the man-
date. But should Parliament not
consist of more than a venue for the
debate between government and op-
position, designed to influence the
next election?  This idea is all the more
questionable because the government
only has a plurality of votes – nowa-
days as little as 42 or 43 per cent –
which only the operation of FPTP
transforms into a legislative majority.
Thus, it can well be argued that a
popular majority has voted against the
party which forms the government –
and the mandate which it is empow-
ered to push through Parliament.
By definition, where parties can
rarely hope to form a single-party gov-
ernment, as in most countries with PR
elections, the parties with different
programmes coming together after an
election to form a coalition do not
seem to have a mandate in the same
sense, even if they can agree on a
common programme (we shall see
they often can). However, the major-
ity often seems ‘manufactured’ in the
sense that one or even all of the part-
ners may have lost votes in the
election and still form a government;
and also in the sense that it may be
the product of unseen political deal-
ings.
Yet most countries using PR sys-
tems do have something like mandate
arrangements, though less so in frag-
mented systems with larger numbers
of parties.  The most obvious case is
where parties form explicit electoral
alliances before the election. As the
Social Democrats and Greens have
just done in Germany, the allies pro-
claim their intention of serving
together in government if they win the
election. Sometimes they even issue
a common ‘Programme of Govern-
ment’ so electors know what
government policies they are voting
for. Thus, election alliances can sub-
stitute quite effectively for single
parties, particularly if one alliance of
parties is lined up against another, so
electors are able to choose between
two clear-cut opposing alternatives.
Such alliances have been common in
Germany, where the Free Democrats
have generally formed an alliance
with one or other of the two larger
parties, the Christian or Socialist
Democrats. They also occur in Ire-
land, though not so frequently, with
Fine Gael and Labour allied against
Fianna Faìl. In Sweden and Norway
the ‘bourgeois’ parties usually state
their intention of forming a govern-
ment together if they get a majority.
In other countries, all the parties
of the left join forces against an alli-
ance of all the right-wing parties, with
the intention of producing either a left
or a right government depending on
which tendance gets a popular major-
ity. In this case, electors have a choice
between left and right priorities,
though it is not always clear exactly
which parties will be in and out of
government. In Norway and Sweden,
22 + The Politico’s Guide to Electoral Reform in Britain
the contest is essentially between the
bourgeois, centre-right alliance, and
the left, represented by Social Demo-
crats or Labour, the large party, and
small left-socialist or Communist par-
ties.  If the left gets a majority a
single-party Social Democratic or La-
bour government will form, supported
by the smaller left party. The outcome
of the vote is blurred a little by the
question of which bourgeois govern-
ment will form in the case of a
centre-right majority – which not may
not always include all the allied par-
ties.
An academic study of the influence
of electors over the making of govern-
ments between 1950-90 in 16 nations
found that electors determined the
formation of nearly every government
in countries using plurality-rule elec-
tions – the UK, USA, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand (to 1994).
But they also determined the making
of most governments in Ireland, Ger-
many, Sweden, Norway and (just)
Denmark and exercised partial con-
trol over most others.
On the positive side, coalition gov-
ernments are likely to include the
‘middle party’ which represents the
‘average’ elector, and to avoid putting
government in the hands of a fairly
extreme plurality, which the majority
might even be said to oppose. The
problem for FPTP in Britain, based on
a plurality rather than a real majority
of the popular vote, is that it cannot
guard against this happening (as in
the 1980s).  Thus coalitions are gen-
erally more likely to satisfy a wider
concept of representation, or voter
choice, than the classic mandate
theory – particularly as the coalition
will come closer to representing the
choices of voters from parties ex-
cluded from government than
single-party plurality rule.  Further,
formal electoral alliances of two or
more parties do offer electors a clear
choice between two different pro-
grammes and usually produce a
government with a genuine majority.
This is secured, however, by party
strategies and behaviour, not by for-
mal constitutional arrangements
Further research by political scien-
tists like Professor Ian Budge, of the
University of Essex, has shown that
coalitions do not make it harder for
parties to keep their commitments,
owing to agreements among the part-
ners which let each pursue their own
differing priorities. A comparative
study in ten liberal democracies of the
relationship between election priori-
ties and government spending found
that coalitions in Germany, Sweden
and Austria were more likely to stick
closer to their manifesto priorities
than single-party governments in Brit-
ain, Australia and the USA, while also
satisfying a broader section of society
than UK governments are able to do
(see further Stability and Choice: a
review of single party and coalition
government, by Ian Budge, Demo-
cratic Audit Paper No. 15, 1998).
AV-Plus is designed to avoid some
of the disadvantages of coalition poli-
tics, as seen from a British perspective,
though as we have seen, these can be
greatly exaggerated. The fact that it
is partially rather than fully propor-
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tional means that coalition govern-
ments will be rarer in the UK than in
western Europe. But this brief review
suggests that British voters have little
to fear from coalition governments
and something to gain.  The partners
in coalitions here are likely to seek to
honour individual party programmes,
or pre-election agreements; any coa-
litions are likely to reflect a majority
of voters; and the prospect of parties
with extreme views gaining power
will diminish.
How effective are coalition
governments?
National well-being is hard to meas-
ure directly. It is almost impossible to
trace out exactly what is due to gov-
ernment action and what is due to
other, often structural and institutional
factors. So in talking about the gen-
eral effectiveness of coalitions we can
only offer relevant but not conclusive
evidence. Where this evidence is most
convincing, however, is in destroying
any idea that there is a prima facie
case against the effectiveness of coa-
litions in general. Indeed, if there is a
prima facie case to be made, it is
against the general effectiveness and
efficiency of single-party govern-
ments. Erring on the side of caution,
however, it is probably best to say that
there are only limited grounds for
claiming greater effectiveness of one
side over the other.
The most commonly used measure
of national well-being is economic
growth, as measured by the annual
increase in Gross Domestic Product.
Table 2 presents average annual
growth figures for the United King-
dom and the USA and broadly
comparable countries in Europe
(France, Germany, Italy) which have
coalition governments, for the period
1960-90. The growth figures are
shown before and after the oil shocks
of the mid-1970s. What they reveal is
common knowledge. Britain’s growth
rate lagged behind the coalition coun-
tries in the earlier period, as did that
of the USA. After the oil shocks the
figures became more equal, but there
is no sharp divide between countries
with different forms of government.
Britain and France parallel each other
as do the USA and Italy. German
growth temporarily slowed down but
jumped again at the end of the dec-
ade (4 per cent in 1989). Growth in
GDP hardly decides the matter of
course. Various ‘quality of life’ meas-
ures, recording the adverse affects of
growth, show Britain performing bet-
ter than Japan but hardly better than
Germany and France.
The general point is, however, that
Table 2: Rates of Growth of GDP in
Comparable Countries with and without
Coalition Government, 1962-88*
Average GDP rate of increase for:
1962-1972 1977-1988
France 4.7 1.6
Germany 3.6 1.3
Italy 3.9 2.2
UK 2.2 1.8
USA 3.0 2.3
*Annual Percentage Rates of Increase in Gross Domestic
Product)
Source: Ian Budge, ‘Relative Decline as a Political Issue’,
Contemporary Record, vol 7, No. 1, (Summer 1993), p. 5.
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even under a Thatcherite regime
which concentrated the powers of sin-
gle-party government to an unusual
degree and focused on economic
growth, Britain hardly stands out as
exceptional. Even at best, it lags be-
hind the country, Italy, whose coalitions
could most justly be criticised for weak-
ness and indecisiveness.
On the general historical record,
too, postwar British governments do
not appear as more generally success-
ful than German – or indeed Italian –
governments which in two decades
brought the country out of occupation
and defeat to prosperity and military
security. Broadening the comparison,
one could not say that Scandinavia,
often under minority governments or
coalitions, offers less quality of life
than Britain; or the Low Countries ei-
ther. Such general comparisons are
about as far as we can take the matter
and must be severely qualified. They
certainly do not indicate, however, that
coalition governments are less effective
than single-party governments.
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AV-PLUS – THE BASICS OF
THE JENKINS SCHEME
We go on in the next section,‘How AV-Plus would haveworked in 1997 and 1992’
to test the Commission’s scheme un-
der the quite different political
conditions of 1997 and 1992. This sec-
tion of the guide explains the basics
of the scheme and how the local and
top-up seats are distributed in Great
Britain, and goes on to describe the
methodology which has been em-
ployed to test the scheme, and a
variant using FPTP for the local elec-
tions. Much of the detailed
explanation of the methodology is
fairly technical in nature. We set it out
here because we believe in transpar-
ency, but it may be passed over by
readers who are not expert in such
matters. The section as a whole is
based on the evaluation of the Com-
mission’s final AV-Plus scheme
presented to the Commission by
Patrick Dunleavy and Helen
Margetts, its academic consultants.
Constituency and top-up seats
under the Jenkins scheme
The Commission decided finally to
present the government with three
alternatives of the same basic scheme,
varying only in the ratios of constitu-
ency to top-up MPs. The three options
use the same basic structure of areas.
We test them under the quite differ-
ent conditions of 1992 and 1997, the
last two elections, and compare the
results of the Jenkins Commission’s
choice, using the alternative vote (AV)
for elections of constituency MPs,
with the results of using plurality-
rule, or first past the post, elections to
choose them.
The three top-up area schemes ex-
amined are:
l Scheme A, with 112 top-up seats in
Great Britain (17.5 per cent of the to-
tal number of MPs);
l Scheme B, with 128 top-up seats (20
per cent of the total)
l Scheme C, with 96 top-up seats (15
per cent of the total).
The three schemes use the same set
of 78 top-up areas in Great Britain to
group together Westminster constitu-
encies for the purposes of allocating
one or top-up MPs. (We discuss the
special problems raised by Northern
Ireland below; see pp. 55-8.) As the
final scheme was defined very late on
in the Commission’s processes, we
present data for the FPTP elections in
slightly different and older versions of
schemes A, B and C. The differences
in terms of seats for the different par-
ties are very small. But readers should
note that the allocation of top-up seats
between England, Scotland and
Wales varies slightly more between
the final and earlier versions of the
three schemes.
26 + The Politico’s Guide to Electoral Reform in Britain
The top-up areas, as defined by the
Commission, are:
1. Counties in England outside met-
ropolitan areas. Four very large
counties – Kent, Essex, Lancashire
and Hampshire – are split in half. This
step simplifies the size range of top-
up areas, and very importantly avoids
creating too large a variation between
top-up areas in the threshold levels
at which parties would win seats, a
feature otherwise likely to have a se-
verely distorting effect on party
behaviour)
2. Sub-divisions of London and the
metropolitan counties, which fit with
district or borough boundaries, so far
as possible.
3. The existing top-up areas to be used
in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh
Assembly elections in 1999, which
correspond to the Euro-constituency
boundaries recommended by the re-
spective Boundary Commissions for
the two countries in their thorough
1996 reports.
The resulting areas (with two ex-
ceptions) all contain at least five
current parliamentary constituencies,
and no more than 11 constituencies.
Table 3 shows the number of top-up
areas in the Commission’s schema by
the number of existing MPs. The most
common total of MPs each areas
would have is eight (which is also the
median size).
The distribution around the me-
dian is fairly symmetric, except for a
small bulge of 12 areas with 11 MPs
each. There is a single historic county
in the scheme (Northumberland) with
only four MPs, including one top-up
MP; and another county (Stafford-
shire) with 12 MPs in total, including
two top-up MPs. The Commission
could have removed these discrepan-
cies, by merging Northumberland
with a neighbouring county (such as
Durham, creating another 11-seater)
and splitting Staffordshire up into two
top-up areas (with six seats in each).
But it finally decided to tolerate such
minor anomalies in order to maintain
historical areas.
The basis for allocating top-up
seats in all three schemes is that ar-
eas with fewer Westminster
constituencies have only a single top-
up MP, while larger areas are
allocated two top-up MPs. The differ-
ences between the A, B and C
schemes arise simply from the thresh-
old at which a top-up area qualifies
for two top-up MPs. The allocation
rule is:
(i) Calculate the number of top-up
Table 3: The distribution of top-up areas
by total number of MPs in each area,
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Total MPs in No. of top- % of top-
top-up area: up areas up areas
Four 1 1.3
Five 6 7.5
Six 10 12.5
Seven 12 15.0
Eight 15 18.8
Nine 13 16.3
Ten 10 12.5
Eleven 12 15.0
Twelve 1 1.3
All areas 80 100.2 %
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MPs needed in each component coun-
try of the UK to maintain a constant
ratio of top-up to total MPs, (20, 17.5
or 15 per cent according to which
scheme is adopted);
(ii) Assign one top-up seat to each
top-up area in each country;
(iii) Assign a second top-up seat to
the most populous top-up areas in
each country, ranked in descending
order of their population size (meas-
Table 4: Top-up MPs and areas with two top-up seats across Great Britain
Scheme A: 112 seats
All seats Top-up Top-up Two-seat Top-up seats
areas seats top-up areas as % of all
GB 641 78 112 34 17.5
England 529 65 92 27 17.4
Scotland 72 8 13 5 18.1
Wales 40 5 7 2 17.5
Scheme B: 128 seats
All seats TU areas TU seats Two-seat TU seats as
TU areas % of all
GB 641 78 128 50 20.0
England 529 65 106 41 20.0
Scotland 72 8 14 6 19.4
Wales 40 5 8 3 20.0
Scheme C: 96 seats
All seats TU areas TU seats Two-seat TU seats as
TU areas % of all
GB 641 78 96 18 15.0
England 529 65 79 14 14.9
Scotland 72 8 11 3 15.3
Wales 40 5 6 1 15.0
ured by number of electors), until all
available top-up seats in that country
have been allocated.
Thus, under scheme A the 27 top-
up areas in England with most
electors are assigned two top-up seats
each, plus the five most populous ar-
eas in Scotland and the two most
Welsh areas. Table 4 shows how the
number of top-up seats would vary
across the three countries in Great
Britain and across the different
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schemes.  The size of the Commis-
sion’s top-up areas in terms of
population size is shown in Table 5.
The distribution of top-up areas by the
size of the electorate has a peak of 21
areas between 500,000 and 600,000
electors, tapering off fairly symmetri-
cally to either side. Only one top-up
area (Northumberland) has fewer
than 300,000 electors, while two (Staf-
fordshire and Devon) have rather
more than 800,000 electors.
The average (mean) number of
electors per top-up area is 546,000
across Britain (for further information,
see the LSE/Birkbeck report, The Per-
formance of the Commission’s
Schemes for a New Electoral System,
by Patrick Dunleavy and Helen
Margetts, LSE Public Policy Group,
1998, p. 10). However, the median fig-
ure (at 525,000) is probably a more
reliable guide to average sizes over-
all, since it is not distorted by higher
numbers in a few areas. The mean fig-
ure in England is slightly larger at
560,000, while the means for Scotland
and Wales are considerably lower at
493,000 and 440,000 respectively. (In
these two countries the median is less
representative because of the small
number of cases.)
Calculating the effects of AV-Plus
The calculations conducted here use
data from the 1997 and 1992 election
to project forward results for the Com-
mission’s chosen voting scheme.
However, readers need to be aware of
the simulation methods used and
some of their key limitations. We
wanted to compare the effects of the
Commission’s AV-Plus scheme with
those of an equivalent AMS scheme
– that is, the Jenkins scheme using
FPTP in local elections rather than AV.
(The Jenkins scheme belongs broadly
within the AMS family of electoral
systems.)  This modified version of
AMS would be the scheme which the
dissenting Commission member, Lord
Alexander of Weedon QC, was in ef-
fect recommending in his ‘note of
reservation’.
However, our data from 1992 and
1997 are only completely accurate for
a ‘classic’ AMS scheme (with half the
seats local and half top-up MPs)
which pairs existing Westminster con-
stituencies. Since the Commission’s
scheme involves retaining local seats
for five out of six seats (or four out of
five) – an utterly different proportion
– our approach has been as follows:
1. We defined a set of local seats for
‘classic’ AMS within the Commis-
sion’s 78 top-up areas, and projected
an outcome in terms of both local and
top-up seats for each such area. Note
that the AMS pairings used here are
distinctive because the constituencies
have had to be paired so that all pair-
Table 5: The distribution of top-up areas
by size of electorate
Electors per top-up area: No. of top-up areas
Below 300,000 people 1
300000 to 399,000 people 11
400000 to 499,000 people 19
500000 to 599,000 people 21
600000 to 699,000 people 11
700000 to 799,000 people 13
Over 800000 people 2
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ings fall within the 78 top-areas. The
AMS pairings here are quite differ-
ent from those used in Making Votes
Count 2: Mixed Electoral Systems
(Democratic Audit Paper No. 14,
1998). The pairs of seats there only
had to fit within 11 or 18 broad regions
used to allocate top-up MPs.
2. We established the difference be-
tween each party’s local seats in the
100 per cent local scheme (that is, the
general election constituencies) and
in the 50:50 scheme. From there we
computed a marginal increment (or
decrease) in local seats which each
party in each top-up area would re-
ceive, as the proportion of local seats
in that area grows from 50 to 100 per
cent in single percentage steps. This
marginal increment stage is key be-
cause in some top-up areas with odd
numbers of total seats, our ‘classic’
AMS solution will in fact involve
fewer than half of seats being local
seats. For instance, in a seven-mem-
ber area, we had to form two AMS
pairs of seats, plus an AMS triple, giv-
ing only three local seats.*
3. A small additional complication is
that the percentage of all seats in each
top-up area varies considerably in the
Commission’s schema, depending on
* For technical readers, a detailed listing is available from LSE which provides a details of
all the current Westminster parliamentary constituencies in each of the top-up areas. This
listing also gives a column for an ‘AMS pairing’, indicating which constituencies have been
paired together to compute the ‘classic’ AMS local seats data. There are also a fair number of
cases where three constituencies have had to be joined here to fit within the top-up area
boundaries. We have tried to pair socially similar constituencies and to preserve so far as
possible a diversity of party representation in the paired local seats. But it is important to
bear in mind that these are analytic pairings for research purposes only. The actual local seat
boundaries which would be set under the Commission’s scheme in action will not resemble
these pairings, but be much closer to the 100 per cent local scheme seats in use at present.
the number of MPs per area and the
point where two top-up seats limit is
placed. Table 6 (over) shows that both
in top-up areas with seven or fewer
MPs, and in areas with ten or more
MPs, the top-up MPs’ share of all MPs
is constant across the three schemes.
But in top-up areas with eight or nine
MPs this share fluctuates sharply
across the schemes. In Scheme A, the
share of top-up MPs varies from 12.5
to 22 per cent; in Scheme B, from 14-
25 per cent; and in Scheme C. from
11-20 per cent.
4. For the actual proportion of local
seats in each top-up area under the
Commission’s scheme we then inter-
polated a local seats projection for that
scheme. An essential assumption here
is that there is a linear relationship
between changes in the proportion of
local seats used under various AMS
schemes and in the seats won by par-
ties. If this relationship is not in fact
completely linear, some distortions
will arise in our estimates.
5. In a number of cases the model
makes conflicting arithmetical predic-
tions of the number of seats that would
be won by two different parties in a
single top-up area – for instance, re-
quiring that two parties win the same
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local seat. These cases have to be re-
solved judgementally, making
reference to the geographic pattern
and extent of party support in that top-
up area in the base election year, and
the fit between these variables and the
likely AMS constituencies under the
Commission’s scheme in that top-up
area.
6. Having estimated local seat out-
comes under the Commission’s
scheme, we then allocated the one or
two top-up seats in each area using
the d’Hondt allocation rule (already
legislated for use in the Scottish Par-
liament, Welsh Assembly and
European Parliament elections).
Again this method is slightly differ-
ent from our previous work (which
allocated top-up seats using a generic
‘minimising DV’ allocation rule). The
distinctive impact of the d’Hondt rule
is relatively restricted, however, be-
cause there are so few top-up seats in
each area, and these seats normally
Table 6: Top-up MPs as a percentage of all MPs in a top-up area across different sizes
of top-up area
Total number of MPs Number of top- Top-up MPs as a % Comment
in a top-up area up seats of all MPs in the area
Five One 20% All schemes
Six One 17% All schemes
Seven One 14% All schemes
Seven Two 28% A few areas, varies by scheme
Eight One 12.5% Some areas, varies by scheme
Eight Two 25% Some areas, varies by scheme
Nine One 22% A few areas in Scheme C
Nine Two 22% Most areas, all schemes
Ten Two 20% All schemes
Eleven Two 18% All schemes
go to very conspicuously under-rep-
resented parties. Note that the impact
of the top-up seat allocations still
tends to correct for any substantial
biases in estimating local seats distri-
butions – because in the end AMS
seats must get as close to matching
vote shares as the number of available
top-up MPs allows.
Our procedures for simulating AV-
Plus outcomes are essentially the
same as for a Jenkins version of AMS,
with one significant difference. We
used data from our 1992 and 1997
surveys on how people filled in AV
ballot papers across the regions of
Great Britain (13 in 1992 and 18 in
1997) to run AV contests in the exist-
ing Westminster constituencies, and
in our AMS-paired constituencies.
These 100 per cent and 50 per cent
local seats outcomes under AV were
then substituted in the simulation,
instead of the plurality-rule results
used with AMS.
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In estimating all these outcomes
we have worked directly from the con-
stituency votes in the two general
elections. We have therefore arrived
at a whole top-up area vote under both
AV-Plus and an AMS version of
Jenkins by aggregating up votes from
the component constituencies, since
this data is much more fine-grain than
any we could generate from our sur-
vey responses. Nonetheless this is an
important limitation. In some of our
work, notably a publication Devolu-
tion Votes (LSE Public Policy Group,
1997) dealing with the likely results
under AMS of elections to the Scot-
tish Parliament and Welsh Assembly,
we compared simulation outcomes
using actual votes only with outcomes
obtained using more voting patterns
projected from our survey data. Some
significant differences arise because
of vote-splitting effects (See the sec-
tion, ‘Split-ticket tactical voting’
below). Under the Commission’s sys-
tem, voters will have two separate
ballot papers, and they may choose to
vote differently at the constituency
level and for top-up MPs. If highly
organised or differential ‘tactical vot-
ing’ should emerge on a significant
scale, there will be some variations
from the results reported in the main
tables here  The potential impact is
greater with AV-Plus than with an
AMS variant.
We have also used a simpler way
of modelling the results for the 1992
general election than we did in pre-
viously published work. We have used
the BBC/ITN data showing the 1992
results re-calculated on the basis of
the 1997 constituencies, instead of
going back to reconstruct the whole
constituency map as we did in Mak-
ing Votes Count and Making Votes
Count 2: Mixed Electoral Systems. The
reason for this change is fundamen-
tally logistical: Dunleavy and
Margetts could not calculate the re-
sults for 1992 within the
Commission’s 78 areas in any other
way within the deadlines they were
working to. We have reservations
about the accuracy of the re-calcu-
lated BBC/ITN data, but since the
Commission’s schemes use 78 top-up
areas instead of 18 regions, there
would also have been large and una-
voidable inaccuracies in remodelling
the 1992 constituency pattern to fit
these schemes (which of course are
drawn up for the 1997 pattern of con-
stituencies). On balance, we do not
believe that using the BBC/ITN data
produces less accurate figures. We
have carefully cross-checked the re-
sults here and in our published work
and found no substantial divergences.
But readers should note that the ta-
bles of 1992 results add up to 641
constituencies, and not the 634 con-
stituencies actually existing at that
time.
Finally, it is important to stress that
the simulations in this guide provide
only a snapshot picture of how the
Commission’s schemes would have
operated under 1997 and 1992 condi-
tions. They do not (and cannot) take
into account the dynamic effects of the
introduction of a new system. How-
ever, on a number of issues below, we
do cite evidence relevant to thinking
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through such dynamic effects where
it is possible to measure their poten-
tial in quantitative terms. But it is
important to bear in mind is that dy-
namic effects will certainly introduce
divergences from the estimates pub-
lished here.  These estimates are
presented in precise quantitative
terms, but we do not mean to imply
that an electoral system can be fine-
tuned by design decisions. Actual
results under a new electoral system
will reflect the infinite capacity of both
voters and political parties to re-as-
sess and change their behaviour in
response to new conditions.
The supplementary vote
There is another electoral system, the
supplementary vote (SV), which is a
close cousin of the Commission’s
choice for local elections, the alterna-
tive vote. Like AV, SV is used for
elections in single-member constitu-
encies, but instead of numbering all
or some of the candidates in order of
preference, voters simply make a first-
preference and second-preference
choice. Again, a candidate who gains
more than half the first-preference
votes cast is elected. But if no-one
passes this threshold, then only the
two top candidates remain in the con-
test and the second preferences of the
eliminated candidates are distributed
between the top pair. The surviving
candidate with most votes is then
elected, and of course second prefer-
ence votes for eliminated candidates
do not count.
Our research has demonstrated
that in the 1997 general election, SV
produced identical seats outcomes to
AV, both within the current 641 West-
minster constituencies, and in our
paired constituencies. In 1992, there
was a single constituency (Inverness,
Nairn and Lochaber) where the Sup-
plementary Vote would have stymied
a third-placed candidate who would
have won under AV. There were two
other cases in 1992 where a similar
effect came close to happening but in
the end just did not, and one similar
‘near miss’ in 1997. But the only clear
difference between SV and AV out-
comes was the single seat change in
1992. Essentially therefore, SV-Plus
would perform just as AV-Plus would.
Since SV has however different quali-
ties from AV, and is regarded by some
experts as being the superior system,
we are not eliminating it from this
survey of the Jenkins recommenda-
tions.  In all subsequent tables in the
guide, results quoted for AV-Plus will
apply also for SV-Plus.
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HOW AV-PLUS WOULD
HAVE WORKED IN 1997
AND 1992
We now examine how thethree versions of Jenkin’sAV-Plus – schemes A, B
and C – would have performed under
1997 conditions. This general election
is a difficult one for any electoral sys-
tem to cope with for two reasons. First,
4.4 per cent of the electorate voted for
small parties with diminutive vote
shares, which are unlikely to secure
representation under any electoral
system. This figures is twice as high
as the British norm of around 2 per
cent for smaller parties. Second, the
leading party (Labour) was 14 per-
centage points ahead of the second
party (the Conservatives), gaining in
effect 1.5 times their principal rival’s
vote and so greatly strengthening the
possibility of a ‘leader’s bias’ effect.
Under AV-Plus, local members are
elected under the alternative vote to
ensure that all constituency MPs win
majority support in their locality. The
simpler version of AV, the supplemen-
tary vote (SV; see p. 32), achieves the
same aim. In British politics, the ex-
tent to which either of these
majoritarian systems make a differ-
ence compared with plurality-rule is
basically governed by the distribution
of the second preferences of Liberal
Democrat voters (and to a lesser de-
gree, of voters for minor parties too).
In 1997, Liberal Democrats gave the
largest share of their second prefer-
ences to Labour, so that in
constituencies where the Liberal
Democrats ran third, Labour was ad-
vantaged and the Tories lost out – an
effect apparent both in actual West-
minster constituency contests re-run
under SV or AV and in our paired
AMS constituencies. In areas where
the Liberal Democrats ran second,
they could generally rely on attract-
ing the bulk of third-placed
candidates’ second preferences,
whether Conservatives or Labour.
Table 7 shows the overall outcomes
of the Commission’s ‘middle scheme’
– scheme A with 112 top-up MPs (or
17.5 per cent of all MPs). The table
shows both the local and top-up seats
the parties would have won under AV-
Plus in 1997, and the parties’ total
number of seats, for England and
English regions, Scotland and Wales.
The table also shows the deviation
from proportionality on a regional and
national basis. Note that the results
are grouped by countries and English
regions, not by top-up areas (for
which, see Table 9). Thus, in 1997,
Labour would have gained virtually
all their seats under AV-Plus at the
local level, the 357 local seats in Great
Britain being enough in fact to secure
3
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Table 7: Seats won under AV-Plus with 112 (17.5%) top-up in re-run 1997 election (Great Britain)
Local seats Top-up seats All seats
Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Total DV
South West 3 14 25 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 12 14 25 0 0 51 18.8
South East 50 32 14 0 0 6 7 8 0 0 56 39 22 0 0 117 7.9
West Midlands 7 39 3 0 0 9 0 1 0 0 16 39 4 0 0 59 18.3
East Anglia 6 10 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 8 11 3 0 0 22 11.7
East Midlands 10 25 1 0 0 4 1 3 0 0 14 26 4 0 0 44 11.3
Yorks & Humb’side 4 39 3 0 0 7 1 2 0 0 11 40 5 0 0 56 19.5
North 1 28 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 7 28 1 0 0 36 16.9
North West 5 47 3 0 1 10 0 4 0 0 15 47 7 0 1 70 12.9
London 7 48 5 0 0 11 0 3 0 0 18 48 8 0 0 74 15.4
ENGLAND 93 282 57 0 1 64 10 22 0 0 157 292 79 0 1 529 11.6
SCOTLAND 0 47 9 6 0 5 0 0 5 0 5 47 9 11 0 72 19.7
WALES 0 28 3 3 0 5 0 1 0 0 5 28 4 3 0 40 15.3
GREAT BRITAIN 93 357 69 9 1 74 10 23 5 0 167 367 92 14 1 641 12.9
Compare:
GREATBRITAIN 1992 277 223 24 5 0 39 17 50 6 0 316 240 74 11 0 641 8.7
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an overall majority in the House of
Commons (where the winning post is
330 seats). The Conservatives would
still be under-represented, gaining
almost the same total of seats (167) as
they did in the actual general elec-
tion (165), while the Liberal
Democrats would double their seat
count from 46 actual seats in 1997 to
92 MPs under AV-Plus.
The deviation (DV) scores in Table
7 measure how many MPs would hold
seats not justified in terms of their
party’s share of the vote in their re-
gion or the country as a whole. A
fully-proportional system in 1997
would have given a result within the
4 to 8 per cent range, and probably
towards the top end of that range. In
the actual 1997 election under FPTP,
the national DV score was much
higher, at 21 per cent. As usual, the
DV levels are higher at a regional
level than across Britain as a whole,
but they reduce to a lower national
figure principally because a bias in
the Conservatives’ favour in southern
England partly offsets a bias towards
Labour in its heartlands. Under the
Commission’s scheme, the overall
national DV score would have been
12.9 per cent – a score which is three-
fifths less disproportional than the
actual FPTP result in 1997, but still
above the 4-8 per cent levels most
other European countries achieve.
Tables 8 and 9 (pp. 36-37) show
what would have happened in 1997
conditions under the Commission’s
two other schemes – scheme B, with
one in five Commons seats going to
top-up MPs and scheme C with 96
top-up seats (15 per cent). Scheme B
is significantly more proportional,
with deviation from proportionality at
just over 11 per cent – almost halving
the DV score in the actual general
election. However, the scheme would
still be well above the fully-propor-
tional 4 to 8 per cent range for DV
scores. The main change would be to
reduce the number of Labour local
seats, with the extra top-up MPs go-
ing primarily to the Conservatives
who would claim ten more MPs over-
all than in the actual general election.
Labour’s total would fall a bit to 359
seats for Great Britain – still enough
for an overall victory – and the Lib-
eral Democrat total would scarcely
change. With just 96 top-up MPs (15
per cent), disproportionality would
rise appreciably to nearly 15 per cent,
offering the smallest reduction on the
actual general election DV score. La-
bour would be the clear beneficiary
here, winning a major increase in lo-
cal seats (370 in all) at the expense of
all the other parties, though the Lib-
eral Democrats would be only
marginally affected.
But what would happen at local
level? Table 10 (pp 38-40) shows the
results for scheme A (the 17.5 per cent
top-up) at the level of the Commis-
sion’s 78 top-up areas in mainland
Britain. For each area, we show the
vote shares of the major parties, their
projected holdings of local and top-
up seats, and their total seat shares.
We use the d’Hondt counting method
to determine the allocation of top-up
seats. (Interested readers can work out
the number of top-up seats a party has
3
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Table 8: Seats won under AV-Plus with 128 (20%) top-up in re-run 1997 election (Great Britain)
Local seats Top-up seats All seats
Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Total DV
South West 3 14 24 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 13 14 24 0 0 51 16.8
South East 48 31 13 0 0 8 8 9 0 0 56 39 22 0 0 117 7.9
West Midlands 6 39 3 0 0 10 0 1 0 0 16 39 4 0 0 59 18.3
East Anglia 6 9 1 0 0 3 1 2 0 0 9 10 3 0 0 22 9.4
East Midlands 10 25 1 0 0 4 1 3 0 0 14 26 4 0 0 44 11.3
Yorks & Hum 4 36 3 0 0 10 1 2 0 0 14 37 5 0 0 56 14.1
North 1 27 1 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 7 27 2 0 0 36 14.1
North West 5 46 3 0 1 11 0 4 0 0 16 46 7 0 1 70 11.5
London 7 48 5 0 0 11 0 3 0 0 18 48 8 0 0 74 15.4
ENGLAND 90 275 54 0 1 73 11 25 0 0 163 286 79 0 1 529 10.4
SCOTLAND 0 46 8 6 0 6 0 0 6 0 6 46 8 12 0 72 18.3
WALES 0 27 3 3 0 6 0 1 0 0 6 27 4 3 0 40 12.8
GREAT BRITAIN 90 348 65 9 1 85 11 26 6 0 175 359 91 15 1 641 11.6
Compare:
1992 GB TOTAL 268 216 24 5 0 41 24 57 6 0 309 240 81 11 0 641 7.6
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Table 9: Seats won under AV-Plus with 96 (15%) top-up in re-run 1997 election (Great Britain)
Local seats Top-up seats All seats
Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Total DV
South West 3 14 25 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 12 14 25 0 0 51 18.8
South East 50 34 16 0 0 5 6 6 0 0 55 40 22 0 0 117 7.9
West Midlands 7 39 3 0 0 9 0 1 0 0 16 39 4 0 0 59 18.3
East Anglia 7 10 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 8 11 3 0 0 22 11.7
East Midlands 10 25 1 0 0 4 1 3 0 0 14 26 4 0 0 44 11.3
Yorks & Hum 4 41 3 0 0 7 0 1 0 0 11 41 4 0 0 56 21.3
North 1 28 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 7 28 1 0 0 36 16.9
North West 5 51 3 0 1 7 0 3 0 0 12 51 6 0 1 70 18.6
London 7 51 5 0 0 8 0 3 0 0 15 51 8 0 0 74 19.4
ENGLAND 94 293 59 0 1 56 8 18 0 0 150 301 77 0 1 529 13.3
SCOTLAND 0 48 9 6 0 5 0 0 4 0 5 48 9 10 0 72 21.1
WALES 0 29 3 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 29 3 3 0 40 17.8
GREAT BRITAIN 94 370 71 9 1 66 8 18 4 0 160 378 89 13 1 641 14.6
Compare:
1992 GB TOTAL 284 230 26 5 0 31 14 45 6 0 315 244 71 11 0 641 9.2
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Table 10: Seats won under AV-Plus in re-run 1997 election with 17.5% top-up, by top-up 
Vote shares Local seats
Top-up areas Con Lab LD SNP PC Other Con Lab LD Nat Other
Dorset 41.8 18.8 34.1 0.0 0.0 5.3 0 1 6 0 0
Wiltshire 40.2 28.0 26.2 0.0 0.0 5.6 0 2 3 0 0
Gloucestershire 39.4 33.9 22.5 0.0 0.0 4.2 1 3 1 0 0
Bristol and Bath 32.7 36.5 26.3 0.0 0.0 4.5 1 4 3 0 0
Somerset 36.5 17.4 40.6 0.0 0.0 5.4 0 0 4 0 0
Devon 36.8 25.9 31.3 0.0 0.0 6.1 1 3 5 0 0
Cornwall 30.4 17.1 44.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 0 1 3 0 0
Essex South West 39.8 40.1 15.3 0.0 0.0 4.8 4 4 0 0 0
Essex North East 40.9 31.6 22.1 0.0 0.0 5.4 3 1 2 0 0
Oxfordshire 38.0 31.7 24.7 0.0 0.0 5.6 3 1 1 0 0
Berkshire 42.2 28.5 24.6 0.0 0.0 4.7 3 2 1 0 0
Buckinghamshire 43.7 30.6 21.2 0.0 0.0 4.5 4 2 0 0 0
Hertfordshire 40.6 39.7 16.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 4 5 0 0 0
Bedfordshire 38.6 44.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 4.6 2 3 0 0 0
Surrey 46.2 22.3 24.5 0.0 0.0 7.0 7 0 2 0 0
Kent East 39.2 37.7 17.1 0.0 0.0 6.1 2 2 1 0 0
Kent West 41.2 36.8 17.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4 5 0 0 0
East Sussex 39.4 29.2 24.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 2 3 2 0 0
West Sussex 44.7 24.3 25.6 0.0 0.0 5.5 5 1 1 0 0
Hampshire Solent 35.7 33.5 24.9 0.0 0.0 5.9 2 2 3 0 0
Hampshire North 46.3 21.2 28.8 0.0 0.0 5.2 5 1 1 0 0
Warwickshire 38.7 43.8 13.9 0.0 0.0 3.6 1 3 0 0 0
Hereford & Worcs 41.0 32.6 21.9 0.0 0.0 4.5 2 3 2 0 0
Shropshire 37.2 39.7 20.5 0.0 0.0 2.7 0 3 1 0 0
Staffordshire 33.7 51.3 10.7 0.0 0.0 4.2 1 9 0 0 0
Dudley & Sandwell 26.5 55.9 9.8 0.0 0.0 7.9 0 6 0 0 0
Birmingham 28.4 54.6 12.8 0.0 0.0 4.3 1 8 0 0 0
Coventry & Solihull 32.9 47.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 6.6 1 3 0 0 0
Wolverhampton/ Walsall 33.2 54.4 8.3 0.0 0.0 4.2 1 4 0 0 0
Suffolk 37.6 40.2 17.6 0.0 0.0 4.6 2 4 0 0 0
Cambridgeshire 42.0 34.5 17.9 0.0 0.0 5.6 3 2 1 0 0
Norfolk 36.7 39.9 18.2 0.0 0.0 5.1 1 4 1 0 0
Lincolnshire 42.4 36.9 17.5 0.0 0.0 3.1 4 2 0 0 0
Northants 40.4 45.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 3.4 1 4 0 0 0
Leicestershire 36.8 43.8 15.1 0.0 0.0 4.3 3 4 1 0 0
Notts 30.5 54.3 10.9 0.0 0.0 4.3 1 8 0 0 0
Derbyshire 29.5 53.6 13.8 0.0 0.0 3.1 1 7 0 0 0
North Yorkshire 40.0 32.8 23.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 3 2 1 0 0
Humberside 30.4 50.4 15.8 0.0 0.0 3.3 1 6 1 0 0
W Yorkshire: Leeds 28.0 55.3 12.9 0.0 0.0 3.8 0 7 0 0 0
W Yorkshire: Bradford 33.0 49.6 13.2 0.0 0.0 4.3 0 6 0 0 0
Continued overleaf
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won in any area by simply subtract-
ing the local seats from the total seats
figures). Notice that again there are
some high and very high DV scores
in many top-up areas. Even though
these distortions are often
countervailing and even out at na-
tional level, they are real enough at
the level at which voters actually feel
the experience of voting. Despite the
effect of AV, which institutionalises
‘tactical voting’ of the kind which oc-
curred in 1997, with Labour and
Liberal Democrats voters making the
other party their second preference,
and thus damaging the Conservatives
in many seats, a notable feature of the
results is that both the Conservatives
and Labour have an MP in all the top-
up areas, except for four. The
Conservatives are utterly excluded
from three top-up areas in central
Scotland and Labour in the Somerset
top-up area. The Liberal Democrats
have no MP in 25 top-up areas, mostly
in Labour heartlands territory. They,
too, gain no seats in the three central
Scotland top-up areas from which the
Tories are excluded; and indeed eight
of Glasgow’s ten seats go to Labour
(the SNP claims the other two). The
SNP would gain an MP in four out of
eight top-up areas in Scotland, while
Plaid Cymru would win seats in two
out of five top-up areas in Wales. Thus,
the undesirable phenomenon of ‘elec-
toral deserts’, noted by the
Commission (see p. 13), is greatly di-
minished.
For the sake of comparison, Tables
7, 8 and 9 all include a row below the
1997 results showing how the parties
areas (GB)
All seats after top-ups
Con Lab LD Nat Other DVV
1 1 6 0 0 40.9
1 2 3 0 0 29.1
2 3 1 0 0 16.1
3 4 3 0 0 7.2
1 0 4 0 0 39.4
3 3 5 0 0 15.6
1 1 3 0 0 18.9
4 5 1 0 0 10.1
3 2 2 0 0 8.4
3 2 1 0 0 13.6
4 2 2 0 0 8.2
4 2 1 0 0 13.5
5 5 1 0 0 10.6
3 3 0 0 0 17.5
7 2 2 0 0 17.4
3 2 1 0 0 10.8
4 5 2 0 0 9.8
3 3 2 0 0 9.3
5 1 2 0 0 17.8
3 3 3 0 0 8.4
5 2 2 0 0 11.0
2 3 0 0 0 17.5
3 3 2 0 0 8.0
1 3 1 0 0 20.3
3 9 0 0 0 23.7
1 6 0 0 0 29.8
2 8 1 0 0 18.1
2 3 0 0 0 20.2
2 4 0 0 0 12.5
2 4 1 0 0 16.9
3 3 1 0 0 9.2
3 4 1 0 0 10.8
4 2 1 0 0 14.7
2 4 0 0 0 21.6
4 5 1 0 0 9.4
2 8 1 0 0 18.4
2 7 1 0 0 16.4
3 3 2 0 0 6.7
3 6 1 0 0 9.6
1 7 0 0 0 32.2
1 6 0 0 0 36.1
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Table 10 continued
Vote shares Local seats
Top-up areas Con Lab LD SNP PC Other Con Lab LD Nat Other
W Yorkshire: South 25.9 56.9 12.7 0.0 0.0 4.5 0 7 0 0 0
South Yorks
(Sheffield & Rotherham) 16.5 59.7 20.3 0.0 0.0 3.5 0 6 1 0 0
South Yorks
(Barnsley & Doncaster) 16.9 66.3 11.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 0 5 0 0 0
Cleveland 25.2 62.4 9.8 0.0 0.0 2.6 0 5 0 0 0
Tyne & Wear South 14.6 69.4 11.8 0.0 0.0 4.3 0 7 0 0 0
Tyne & Wear North
(inc Newcastle) 21.2 63.8 11.9 0.0 0.0 3.2 0 4 0 0 0
Durham 17.6 68.5 9.7 0.0 0.0 4.2 0 6 0 0 0
Cumbria 33.5 45.8 16.5 0.0 0.0 4.1 1 4 0 0 0
Northumberland 22.7 48.7 25.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0 2 1 0 0
Liverpool & Wirral 19.1 63.5 12.8 0.0 0.0 4.7 0 7 0 0 0
Merseyside North 20.6 60.0 16.5 0.0 0.0 3.0 0 5 1 0 0
Manchester North 25.8 54.2 16.7 0.0 0.0 3.3 0 6 1 0 0
Manchester West 23.6 62.3 10.9 0.0 0.0 3.3 0 7 0 0 0
Manchester East 23.0 53.1 20.2 0.0 0.0 3.7 1 6 1 0 0
Cheshire 33.4 46.5 12.3 0.0 0.0 7.8 2 6 0 0 1
Lancashire South 29.6 55.2 10.8 0.0 0.0 4.3 0 6 0 0 0
Lancashire North 39.3 42.5 14.8 0.0 0.0 3.4 2 4 0 0 0
South East London 36.6 41.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 5.4 3 6 0 0 0
South West London 34.6 33.7 28.2 0.0 0.0 3.5 0 3 4 0 0
South Central London 23.6 57.9 14.3 0.0 0.0 4.2 0 8 1 0 0
North West London 32.8 53.1 10.1 0.0 0.0 3.6 1 8 0 0 0
North London 32.9 52.3 11.4 0.0 0.0 3.4 1 8 0 0 0
North East London 28.2 56.9 8.3 0.0 0.0 6.6 0 8 0 0 0
North Central London 27.4 53.5 12.7 0.0 0.0 6.5 2 7 0 0 0
Scotland: South 22.6 43.4 13.4 19.1 0.0 1.6 0 5 2 1 0
Scot Highlands 16.2 27.0 27.7 26.7 0.0 2.4 0 2 3 1 0
Scot N E 22.4 30.9 18.9 26.1 0.0 1.7 0 4 2 2 0
Scot Mid & Fife 21.1 40.0 12.6 25.3 0.0 1.0 0 5 1 2 0
Scot Central 10.4 59.4 5.2 23.4 0.0 1.6 0 8 0 0 0
Scot West 18.4 52.0 9.4 20.2 0.0 1.3 0 8 0 0 0
Lothians 19.2 45.9 14.9 18.4 0.0 1.5 0 6 1 0 0
Glasgow 8.5 60.2 7.3 19.4 0.0 4.6 0 9 0 0 0
Wales North 24.3 46.7 11.8 0.0 14.2 3.1 0 6 1 1 0
Wales Mid 20.7 37.8 18.4 0.0 20.1 3.0 0 3 2 2 0
Wales South West 15.0 65.6 10.7 0.0 5.7 3.0 0 6 0 0 0
South Wales Central 20.3 58.1 11.8 0.0 5.6 4.2 0 6 0 0 0
South Wales East 16.7 66.1 9.4 0.0 4.2 3.6 0 7 0 0 0
Great Britain 31.5 44.4 17.2 2.0 0.5 4.4 93 357 69 9 1
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would have performed under the
same version of AV-Plus in the 1992
general election. The 1992 election
was a more balanced one, with the
Conservatives on nearly 43 per cent
support, Labour on 35 and the Liberal
Democrats just over 18 per cent. The
distribution of Liberal Democrats’ sec-
ond preferences was more even, with
most support going to the Conserva-
tives nationally and Labour gaining
more Lib-Dem second preferences
than the Tories in only a few regions.
Both Conservative and Labour voters
gave the Liberal Democrats majority
backing at the second preference
stage. In none of the three AV-Plus
scenarios would the Conservatives
have won the overall majority which
FPTP gave them in the actual elec-
tion in 1992. With a 17.5 per cent
top-up in 1992, both the Conservatives
and Labour would have won most of
their seats locally, but would both have
scored well at the top-up stage as well.
The Liberal Democrats would have
won two thirds of their 74 seats at the
top-up stage, but their overall total in
seats would have been lower under
AV-Plus in 1992 than in 1997, even
though their vote was slightly higher
in 1992. The DV score for Scheme A
in 1992 – 8.7 per cent – would be only
slightly outside the full proportional-
ity range (see Table 7).
A 20 per cent top-up scheme in
1992 would have fallen within the
fully-proportional range with a DV
score of 7.6 per cent (see Table 8). The
Liberal Democrats would have in-
creased their share of seats to 81, 57
of them won at the top-up stage, and
All seats after top-ups
Con Lab LD Nat Other DV
1 7 0 0 0 30.6
1 6 2 0 0 8.9
1 5 0 0 0 17.1
1 5 0 0 0 20.9
1 7 0 0 0 18.1
1 4 0 0 0 16.2
1 6 0 0 0 17.2
2 4 0 0 0 20.8
1 2 1 0 0 3.7
1 7 1 0 0 14.3
1 5 1 0 0 11.5
2 6 1 0 0 12.5
2 7 0 0 0 15.5
2 6 2 0 0 6.9
3 6 1 0 1 9.3
2 6 0 0 0 19.8
2 4 1 0 0 14.6
4 6 1 0 0 13.2
2 3 4 0 0 16.3
2 8 1 0 0 14.8
3 8 0 0 0 19.4
2 8 1 0 0 20.5
2 8 0 0 0 23.1
3 7 1 0 0 10.2
1 5 2 1 0 21.0
1 2 3 1 0 16.7
1 4 2 2 0 16.9
1 5 1 2 0 15.6
0 8 0 2 0 20.6
0 8 0 1 0 37.6
1 6 1 1 0 20.7
0 9 0 1 0 29.8
1 6 1 1 0 24.0
1 3 2 2 0 21.6
1 6 0 0 0 17.2
1 6 1 0 0 14.8
1 7 0 0 0 19.3
167 367 92 14 1 12.9
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their gains would have been largely
at the expense of the Conservatives.
Reducing the proportion of top-up
seats to 15 per cent would primarily
have benefited Labour in 1992 (see
Table 9). Labour’s seat total would
actually rise by four compared with
the other two schemes, with most of
their gains coming from the Liberal
Democrats. The DV score would rise
above 9 per cent, a result that is out-
side the full proportionality range of
4 to 8 per cent even in a relatively trac-
table election.
Although the AV-Plus system has
advantages in terms of expanding
voter choice and in giving MPs the
legitimacy of majority support in their
constituencies, it can under some cir-
cumstances carry a heavy penalty in
terms of greater disproportionality. In
elections when one of the major par-
ties is particularly disliked, AV
elections facilitate joint action against
it by voters supporting all the other
parties. In 1997 the Conservatives
would have lost even more heavily
under AV than FPTP because around
61 per cent of voters wanted them out
of power, whereas in 1992 no similar
conditions applied. Thus AV-Plus (or
SV-Plus) automates tactical voting in
the local constituency contests. Con-
sidering previous elections, we would
expect that in 1983, for instance, a
very similar effect would have se-
verely penalised Labour under
AV-Plus. Defenders of AV-Plus might
well argue, however, that these strong
effects arose under plurality rule be-
cause there were not such strong
incentives for parties to maximise
their appeal to voters. Protected in
their safe seat areas and able to se-
cure majorities on low shares of the
vote, parties under plurality rule had
few incentives not to try and bounce
‘extreme’ or unpopular policies into
effect, relying on their core support-
ers alone. Party behaviour can be
expected to change under AV-Plus,
and hence the higher distortions that
arise under AV-Plus rather than an
AMS equivalent using FPTP for the
local elections (see next section be-
low), would in practice be lower than
in our re-modelled 1997 results.
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VOTES AND SEATS UNDER
AMS IN 1997 AND 1992
An AMS version of the Jenkinsschema could have twoadvantages over AV-Plus. It
would be more proportional (as we
show below) than AV-Plus in 1997
conditions and similar elections. And
it would allow UK elections to be
standardised more on a ‘British AMS’
model, since other new electoral sys-
tems on the mainland (for Scotland’s
Parliament, the Welsh National As-
sembly and the Greater London
Assembly) share key features. All of
them use a double-vote AMS ballot,
with FPTP elections for local mem-
bers; all have a majority of members
elected in local constituencies and
fairly small top-up areas; all use the
d’Hondt allocation rule to distribute
seats between parties; and all in ef-
fect have relatively high thresholds for
third parties seeking to win seats. An
AMS version of the Commission
scheme, as advocated by Lord Alex-
ander, the dissenting member, would
arguably fit quite closely within this
wider model, whereas an AV-Plus
scheme introduces a discordant ele-
ment.
Against these points, of course, the
ability of voters to indicate preferences
at the local constituency stage is re-
stricted to one vote (creating tactical
voting incentives to misrepresent their
preferences for some voters), and MPs
in local constituencies could still be
elected with less than majority sup-
port – as 47 per cent of MPs were in
the 1997 general election.
In 1997, an AMS version of the
Commission’s scheme A (with 113
top-up seats, because it is a slightly
earlier variant of the scheme that is
being tested) would have given the
Conservatives almost 30 more seats
than the similar AV-Plus scheme – 194
as against 167 (see Tables 11 and 7).
Two thirds of these seats would have
come from the Liberal Democrats and
the other third from Labour. At 10.8
per cent, the DV score would have
been two percentage points lower
than AV-Plus, although still outside
the fully proportional range. As for
1992, the share of seats among the
major parties differs only slightly be-
tween the AMS version and its
AV-Plus equivalent (Tables 11 and 7),
and the DV score improves only by
less than half of one percentage point.
At top-up level under the AMS ver-
sion of scheme A (though with a
slightly different distribution of seats
between top-up areas),
disproportionality ranges very widely
from an almost perfectly proportional
result in Shropshire (3 per cent) to a
still highly disproportional outcome in
Dorset (45 per cent). While these bi-
ases partly offset each other, they may
still be alienating at the point of vot-
ing and receiving the local result.
4
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Table 11: The share of seats under AMS with 113 (17.6%) top-up seats in the re-run 1997 election, Great Britain
Local seats Top-up seats All seats
Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Total DV
South West 19 11 12 0 0 4 1 4 0 0 23 12 16 0 0 51 8.5
South East 61 29 7 0 0 2 6 12 0 0 63 35 19 0 0 117 12.5
West Midlands 12 37 0 0 0 6 0 4 0 0 18 37 4 0 0 59 14.9
East Anglia 12 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 12 7 3 0 0 22 15.9
East Midlands 12 24 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 15 26 3 0 0 44 11.3
Yorks & Hum 6 40 1 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 12 40 4 0 0 56 19.5
North 2 27 1 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 7 27 2 0 0 36 14.1
North West 6 48 2 0 1 7 0 6 0 0 13 48 8 0 1 70 14.4
London 8 47 5 0 0 10 0 4 0 0 18 47 9 0 0 74 14.0
ENGLAND 138 270 28 0 1 43 9 40 0 0 181 279 68 0 1 529 9.6
SCOTLAND 0 45 8 4 0 7 0 0 8 0 7 45 8 12 0 72 17.0
WALES 0 30 1 3 0 6 0 0 0 0 6 30 1 3 0 40 20.3
GREAT BRITAIN 138 345 37 7 1 56 9 40 8 0 194 354 77 15 1 641 10.8
Compare:
GB TOTAL 1992 287 221 16 5 0 30 15 59 8 0 317 236 75 13 0 641 8.3
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Table 12: The share of seats under AMS with 127 (19.8%) top-up seats in the re-run 1997 election, Great Britain
Local seats Top-up seats All seats
Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other DV
South West 18 11 12 0 0 4 2 4 0 0 22 13 16 0 0 51 6.5
South East 60 27 7 0 0 4 6 13 0 0 64 33 20 0 0 117 13.4
West Midlands 12 36 0 0 0 6 0 5 0 0 18 36 5 0 0 59 13.2
East Anglia 12 6 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 12 7 3 0 0 22 15.9
East Midlands 12 24 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 15 26 3 0 0 44 11.3
Yorks & Hum 6 37 1 0 0 8 0 4 0 0 14 37 5 0 0 56 14.1
North 2 26 1 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 7 26 3 0 0 36 11.3
North West 6 47 2 0 1 8 0 6 0 0 14 47 8 0 1 70 12.9
London 8 47 5 0 0 10 0 4 0 0 18 47 9 0 0 74 14.0
ENGLAND 136 261 28 0 1 48 11 44 0 0 184 272 72 0 1 529 8.9
SCOTLAND 0 45 8 4 0 7 0 0 8 0 7 45 8 12 0 72 17.0
WALES 0 27 1 3 0 7 1 1 0 0 7 28 2 3 0 40 15.3
GREAT BRITAIN 136 333 37 7 1 62 12 45 8 0 198 345 82 15 1 641 9.4
Compare:
1992 GB TOTAL 276 218 16 5 0 34 21 63 8 0 310 239 79 13 0 641 7.6
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Table 13: The share of seats under AMS with 1OO (15.6%) top-up seats in the re-run 1997 election, Great Britain
Seats outcomes in the 1997 election re-run under AMS, with 100 (15.6%) top-up seats (Scheme C)
Local seats Top-up seats All seats
Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Con Lab LD Nat Other Total DV
South West 19 11 12 0 0 4 1 4 0 0 23 12 16 0 0 51 8.5
South East 62 30 7 0 0 2 5 11 0 0 64 35 18 0 0 117 13.4
West Midlands 12 37 0 0 0 6 0 4 0 0 18 37 4 0 0 59 14.9
East Anglia 12 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 12 7 3 0 0 22 15.9
East Midlands 12 24 0 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 15 26 3 0 0 44 11.3
Yorks & Hum 6 41 1 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 12 41 3 0 0 56 21.3
North 2 27 1 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 7 27 2 0 0 36 14.1
North West 6 51 2 0 1 7 0 3 0 0 13 51 5 0 1 70 18.6
London 8 48 5 0 0 9 0 4 0 0 17 48 9 0 0 74 15.4
ENGLAND 139 276 28 0 1 42 8 35 0 0 181 284 63 0 1 529 10.6
SCOTLAND 0 49 7 6 0 5 0 0 5 0 5 49 7 11 0 72 22.5
WALES 0 30 1 4 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 30 1 4 0 40 20.3
GREAT BRITAIN 139 355 36 10 1 52 8 35 5 0 191 363 71 15 1 641 12.2
Compare:
1992 GB TOTAL 291 227 17 6 0 25 15 54 6 0 316 242 71 12 0 641 9.0
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However, the electoral desert effect
would again be greatly diminished,
with Conservative and Labour MPs in
virtually all top-up areas (though the
Liberal Democrats would not win a
seat in 25 out of 78 areas). (See the
LSE/Birkbeck report on the Commis-
sion’s schemes, Dunleavy and
Margetts 1998, pp. 34-7 for the full
results.)
Moving on to scheme B for 127 top-
up MPs (19.8 per cent of the total),
the slightly increased number of top-
up MPs would reduce the DV score
under 1997 conditions to just 9.4 per
cent, or 2.2 percentage points fewer
than for the AV-Plus version of scheme
B (see Tables 12 and 8), and appreci-
ably closer to full proportionality. In
1997, the Liberal Democrats and the
Conservatives would have gained
equally from the additional top-up
MPs, lowering the size of Labour’s
overall majority from 47 to 29 seats.
By contrast, in 1992, the DV score for
the 20 per cent AMS scheme would
be the same as that for AV-Plus, lying
just inside the fully proportional
range. Table 13 shows the results for
AMS using an earlier version of
scheme C with 100 top-up seats. In
1997 conditions, it again performs
more fairly than the equivalent AV-
Plus scheme, but its DV score of over
12 per cent makes it nearly 3 percent-
age points worse than the AMS
scheme B and 1.4 points worse than
scheme A. Most of the top-up seats
lost under scheme C would be in ur-
ban areas so that Labour ’s
representation is particularly boosted.
The Liberal Democrats would not se-
cure seats in 28, or 36 per cent, of the
mainland top-up areas (36 per cent).
In 1992 conditions, there are too few
top-up seats under scheme C to push
the national result into the fully pro-
portional range.
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THE ‘DANGER’ OF SPLIT-
TICKET TACTICAL VOTING
The double-ballot is an important feature of the AV-Plusscheme, allowing people to
vote one way at local level and another
at the top-up stage. However, it is ar-
gued that giving people two votes
offers scope for ‘split-ticket’ tactical
voting which would damage both the
greater proportionality of the new
scheme and its ability to avoid ‘elec-
toral deserts’. This section gives the
results of a sensitivity analysis con-
ducted for the Commission by Patrick
Dunleavy and Helen Margetts on the
basis of the AV-Plus scheme as it ex-
isted in mid-September 1998, with
113 top-up seats in Great Britain, al-
located in 78 top-up areas. (This
scheme is essentially the same as the
Commission’s scheme A, but the seat
figures in Table 14 below differ by five
seats from those in the up-to-date Ta-
ble 7 above.)
Any electoral system can create
incentives for tactical voting, even if
it is fully proportional. But some sys-
tems can be particularly sensitive to
the effects of the strategic behaviour
of voters. FPTP is certainly one of
these, as Michael Portillo and other
Tory MPs In ‘safe’ seats know to their
cost. The columnist Peter Kellner ar-
gued (in the Evening Standard of 7
September 1998 and on BBC2’s
Newsnight the same day) that an AV-
Plus system with a large majority of
local seats and far fewer top-up seats
is especially vulnerable to large-scale
tactical voting if people choose to cast
their votes for top-up MPs differently
from their constituency votes.
Kellner’s basic argument was that
Labour voters in top-up areas where
their party has won a surfeit of local
seats and cannot hope to secure top-
up seats could shift their top-up votes
to the Liberal Democrats in suffi-
ciently heavy numbers to squeeze out
one or more possible Tory top-up MPs
in these areas. He claimed that about
a third of Labour voters behaving in
this way could have relegated the
Conservatives in 1997 to third place
in the Commons, even though they
were clearly second in the popular
vote.
There are strong reasons for doubt-
ing whether such a scenario, or its
Conservative equivalent, is likely to
occur in practice. First, Kellner as-
sumed that the top-up areas would be
regional, whereas the far smaller top-
up areas would be less susceptible to
large-scale manipulation and the ef-
fects of any organised tactical strike
would be more contained. will Fur-
ther, with only one or two top-up MPs
per area, a second-placed party un-
represented in local seats may well
have piled up a significant lead in
votes over the third-placed party – re-
quiring a lot of tactical voting for this
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lead to be over-turned under the
d’Hondt counting system (which
tends to favour large parties).
The culture of Britain’s political
parties also runs strongly against any
such organised strategy, even though
local parties did in 1997 covertly en-
courage tactical voting. It would also
be an unusually confident party which
decided that it would cream off all the
local seats – and then determined to
ask its voters to vote for another party.
There are clear risks in such a strat-
egy for Labour (say). Could party
organisers be sure that the only effect
of encouraging its voters to switch to
the Liberal Democrats at the top-up
stage would be to squeeze out the To-
ries? For over quite a short period, the
perceived viability of the Liberal
Democrats may improve, as indeed it
has already done under FPTP in seats
like Cheltenham, as a result of con-
scious and unconscious tactical voting
by Labour supporters. They could
then become serious rivals to Labour
for local seats, especially if local Tory
voters also began to see the Liberal
Democrats as a more electable ‘oppo-
sition’ party. This kind of process has
already occurred at local government
level in Labour strongholds such as
Liverpool and Sheffield. Finally, the
ability of political parties to organise
such complex manoeuvres must be in
doubt.
As for the voters themselves, not
many more than one in ten attempt to
vote tactically, and fewer still achieve
their objective. First, they must vote
in the right direction in the right con-
stituencies to achieve their goal.
Much tactical voting misfires because
the voters simply get it wrong, or be-
cause of countervailing tactical
decisions by different groups of vot-
ers.
We have assessed how vulnerable
to ‘split-ticket’tactical voting AV-Plus
would have been in the very different
conditions of 1997 and 1992. We ex-
amined all 78 top-up areas in Great
Britain in both election years to iden-
tify those where
l the leading party wins all or the
bulk of local seats, so that voters could
foresee that this party would not be
able to win a top-up seat; and
l the leading party has a convincing
lead in terms of vote shares over the
second-placed party within that top-
up area. This criterion ensures that the
political dominance of the leading
party is visible to voters, since it is not
just an artefact of hard-to-anticipate
seat allocations.
For each such seat we calculated
the minimum amount of tactical vot-
ing by the leading party’s supporters
which would be necessary to raise the
third-placed party above the second
and thus to win a top-up seat if abso-
lutely everyone who could vote
tactically did so. In 1997, there were
35 areas where Labour vote-switching
could in such extreme circumstances
cost the Tories a seat, and two cases
where the reverse effect could apply.
In 1992, there were 21 cases where
Labour voters, and 12 where Con-
servative voters, could bring about
seat losses for their opponents.
What is important, however, is the
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likely level of vote-switching required
to trigger these losses. In 1997 for in-
stance if a more realistic 10 per cent
of voters for Labour and the Conserva-
tives in vulnerable top-up areas ‘split’
their votes, the Conservatives would
have lost nine seats and Labour one,
giving the Liberal Democrats ten more
seats. In 1992, the Conservatives
could have lost five seats and Labour
three, adding eight seats to the Lib-
eral Democrats’ total. It is only at an
extreme level of tactical voting, such
as the 30 per cent assumed by Peter
Kellner, that there is a significant ef-
fect. At that level, 23 Conservative and
two Labour seats could have been lost
in 1997, and 17 Tory and eight Labour
in 1992. The Conservatives in fact
would have been badly hit in 1997 if
more than 15 per cent of Labour vot-
ers split their votes tactically.
But what overall damage would
concerted split voting inflict on the
proportionality of elections under AV-
Plus? As we have explained above, it
is possible to measure deviation from
proportionality (see p. 9) and give it a
score (the ‘DV score’) for the sake of
comparison. In 1997, we calculate that
the DV score under AV-Plus would
have remained basically unchanged
right up to levels of split-voting just
below Kellner’s 30 per cent. Only at
or above that level – with 30 per cent
of Labour and Tory supporters voting
tactically for top-up MPs and doing
so with remarkable accuracy, all vot-
ing the right way in the right
constituencies – would a tiny adverse
effect reveal itself. In 1992, split-ticket
tactical voting by both Tory and La-
bour supporters would actually im-
prove the DV score, by raising the
representation of the Liberal Demo-
crats to more proportional levels and
reducing in a more even-handed way
the over-representation of the other
two main parties. The DV score falls
rapidly at all levels of tactical voting
and, at Kellner’s 30 per cent point, the
score would actually be halved. So
AV-Plus system would then be oper-
ating within the fully-proportional
range! Thus split-ticket tactical vot-
ing is not at all the great danger for
democracy which the ingenious
Kellner supposed (see Dunleavy and
Margetts, LSE-Birkbeck 1998, for
more detailed figures).
There would however be one ad-
verse consequence. Split-ticket voting
of this kind would somewhat offset the
effect which an AV-Plus electoral sys-
tem would otherwise have in
improving the representation of other
parties in areas of one-party domi-
nance (Jenkins’s ‘electoral deserts’).
Substantial split-ticket tactical voting
would erode AV-Plus’s ability to
broaden the regional base of the Con-
servative and Labour parties (though,
of course, it would not increase the
leading party’s predominance).
But it is worth noting as well that
split-ticket voting would primarily re-
flect the expansion of voter choice
which the scheme allows. The Con-
servatives lost out badly in 1997
because a large body of voters for
other parties were also very hostile to
them. Had the policies and perform-
ance of the Conservatives in
government reflected more sensitively
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what the public wanted, this marked
hostility would not have existed. It
might be argued that the adoption of
an electoral system which penalises
parties which get so out of touch with
people’s wishes would expand politi-
cal accountability to the people, and
is to be preferred over a system, such
as FPTP, which encourages parties to
try merely to ‘bounce’ the people’s
wishes by gaining a Commons major-
ity by winning over a 42-44 per cent
minority of the electorate.
But how much split-ticket tactical
voting is really likely? Our figures are
based on the assumption that the tac-
tical voting would be undertaken by
perfectly informed voters who could
accurately foresee the results in their
top-up area. They would need to know
far more than they require now vot-
ing in a single constituency under
FPTP. Split-ticket tactical voters would
need to know the political conditions
in their local seat and the likely out-
comes in another four to ten seats in
their top-up area. But many voters
won’t have this level of information
in many areas. It may be fairly clear
to Labour supporters in Glasgow for
instance, but could the same be said
for the party’s voters in north east
London?
A change in the way we vote will
clearly set in train dynamic effects, but
as we have stressed in all our work
on electoral reform, these effects can
not be scientifically estimated. It is
very likely that voters in the first elec-
tion under a new system will be very
unclear how it is going to work. It is
also probable that any net tactical vot-
ing effects will take time to emerge,
as a result of ‘social learning’. Over
the same period, however, political
parties will also have time to modify
their campaigning strategies to guard
against or to exploit tactical voting
potential.
Overall, we judge that between 5
and 15 per cent of voters as a whole
are likely to choose in divergent ways
between the constituency and the top-
up area votes under the Commission’s
AV-Plus scheme. The level of ‘net’, or
effective, tactical voting is likely to be
below 10 per cent. There is undoubt-
edly some potential for the Liberal
Democrats to advance at the top-up
stage, but there could also be
countervailing effects reflecting that
party’s weaker hold over its voters and
stronger local than national identity.
The net effects on the parties’ overall
national seat total are likely to be
small.
There is a simple remedy to wide-
spread split-ticket tactical voting – a
shift to a one-vote mixed system. But
this would directly restrict an impor-
tant element of voter choice in the
Commission’s schema simply to avoid
a theoretical problem which is any-
way unlikely to distort election results
and may even improve their propor-
tionality.
It is worth recording the evidence
showing that voters appreciate and
use the greater degree of choice made
possible by split-ticket voting. More
than one in three voters in New Zea-
land’s first election in 1996 under a
‘classic’ Additional Member System
(with a 50:50 division of local and top-
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up seats) made different choices at the
two stages of the AMS ballot, even
though most parties stood to gain at
least some top-up seats across the
country. One in eight voters in Ger-
many also exercise their right to split
their vote. In our 1997 work on mod-
elling the future of the Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Assembly
(Devolution Votes, Democratic Audit,
1997), we found that 15 per cent of
voters were prepared to split their vote
in Scotland. Subsequent opinion polls
in Scotland have begun to show simi-
lar levels of split-ticket voting
intentions.
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THE REPRESENTATION OF
SMALL OR ‘EXTREME’
PARTIES
One of the most common criticisms of proportional electoral schemes is that they
fragment the political spectrum by
increasing the ability of very small
parties to secure a seat in the legisla-
ture. There is a particular fear that a
party representing an extreme popu-
list, ethnic identification or racist
viewpoint might gain a parliamentary
bridgehead and perhaps exert an in-
fluence out of all proportion to its
following simply by virtue of it hold-
ing a tactical, or even ‘hinge’, position
in Parliament. The quite atypical ex-
ample of Israel is often held up as a
warning against any kind of propor-
tional system.
We do not intend to enter into the
merits of such fears, or the underly-
ing political viewpoint to which they
give expression, except to point out
that the advent of new parties, as with
the Greens in Germany, or the ad-
vance of a small party such as the
Scottish Nationalists in Scotland, can
reinvigorate the political process and
could improve parliamentary repre-
sentation of our increasingly pluralist
society. Here we concern ourselves
with the question of whether the Com-
mission’s AV-Plus scheme requires a
formal threshold, of the kind which
Germany has, to protect the body poli-
tic from very small parties gaining an
undue influence in the House of Com-
mons on a fraction of the popular vote.
Germany, in fact, applies the quite
high threshold of 5 per cent of the to-
tal vote, victory in a local seat, or
before it can qualify for a top-up seat.
However, Germany and other nations
which set a threshold for entry to their
parliaments operate fully proportional
schemes, and the essence of AV-Plus
is that it deliberately is not fully pro-
portional, precisely to support the
larger parties and to make single-
party government the norm.
Dunleavy and Margetts undertook
extensive analysis of the effective
thresholds created under AV-Plus on
behalf of the Commission. They con-
centrated on the largest top-up areas
– with 11 MPs – because the larger
constituencies are, the more likely are
small parties to win seats. Here we
present a brief summary of their
analysis (for further detail, see their
report to the Commission, LSE/
Birkbeck 1998). Their figures are
theoretical and assume a proportional
allocation of local seats within the top-
up areas. Very broadly, within the
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larger top-up areas where their best
chances of gaining seats are to be
found, small parties would have to
secure more than 8 per cent of the vote
in the area, or some 28,000 votes, to
be sure of gaining a seat. The lowest
percentage of the total vote which
would have secured a top-up seat in
the simulated election results pre-
pared for the Commission was the
10.9 per cent scored by the Liberal
Democrats in Nottinghamshire.
These are in effect very high
thresholds and the Commission has
rightly concluded that there is no need
to set a formal figure. There is no dan-
ger of an extremist party scaling the
effective thresholds built into its
scheme. We have examined the vot-
ing histories of the National Front and
British National Party in national and
local elections and they have never
polled the levels of voters which
would be required across a whole top-
up area to gain a seat in the House of
Commons under AV-Plus.
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THE TREATMENT OF
NORTHERN IRELAND
The Commission wanted to recommend a voting systemwhich could be applied with
equal validity throughout the United
Kingdom, but Northern Ireland al-
ready had a distinctive voting system
of its own, separate from that for the
UK as a whole. The single transfer-
able vote (STV), which is the system
used in Ireland, is also used for elect-
ing the Northern Ireland Assembly,
local authorities and MEPs in the
province. However, the Commission
found that representative organisa-
tions in Northern Ireland also wanted
to have the same system as applied
throughout the UK (even though
some wanted that system to be STV).
As is well known, Northern Ireland
has a completely separate and distinc-
tive party system in which the main
line of cleavage has long been a sec-
tarian one. Assessing alternative
electoral outcomes here is compli-
cated by the larger number of
observable parties, with at least 12
principal parties that might win seats
under a reasonably proportional elec-
toral system. The constituencies
nearly all have idiosyncratic local fea-
tures which set them apart from their
neighbours, not least sharply varying
balances of electors on either side of
the sectarian line. This feature of lo-
cal politics had clear implications for
pairing of constituencies necessary to
calculate results for a 50:50 ‘classic’
AMS or AV-Plus system.
We examined four possible ar-
rangements of the 18 seats in
Northern Ireland, which would allow
an AMS or AV-Plus scheme to be im-
plemented. They are:
l a province-wide scheme with 14
local seats, plus four top-up seats (22
per cent of all MPs);
l a scheme with two top-up areas,
one a ten-seater, the other with eight
seats (including two top-up seats
each);
l the same scheme of a ten-seater and
an eight-seater top-up area, but this
time giving the eight-seater a single
MP (thus providing only three top-up
MPs in the province), comprising 16.7
per cent of all MPs;
l a scheme with three six-seat top-up
areas, each including one top-up MP
(again 16.7 per cent of all MPs).
We had no reliable data on the sec-
ond or subsequent preferences of
voters at the 1997 general election.
Hence we can only present AMS pro-
jections for this election. We obtained
information on second and subse-
quent preferences for the Northern
Ireland Assembly election, held un-
der STV in 1998, from an exit poll of
2,193 respondents (with a weighted
value of 1,637 people). The poll was
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carried out as people left the Assem-
bly election polling stations by Ulster
Marketing Services for RTE, the Irish
state broadcasting corporation. This
election marked a big change in the
politics of the province; the Unionist
bloc split in two with ‘YES Unionists’
backing the peace agreement, and
‘NO Unionists’ opposing it. The vote
for the Ulster Unionist Party fell to a
record low of 21 per cent, and the
Democratic Unionist Party achieved
18 per cent. It is too early to say if this
effect is a one-off, or a harbinger of a
longer-term change. We are able to
provide an AV-Plus projection for
Northern Ireland, based on the 1998
election, though people were voting
for a devolved assembly and not for
Westminster, and the different mix of
issues and responsibilities across the
two bodies may have occasioned dif-
ferent expressions of preferences.
Further, voting behaviour under STV
may be systematically different from
that under AV, and we have by defini-
tion excluded from our analysis
‘loyalist’ voters who chose only to vote
for their first preference party.
Table 14 shows the result of the
Assembly election replayed under the
AV-Plus model that the Commission
recommends for use in Northern Ire-
land – two top-up areas with two
top-up MPs each. The deviation from
proportionality (DV) score is very high
at 17.9 per cent, reflecting in part the
fact that almost 15 per cent of the ini-
tial vote went to small parties which
did not win a seat, and would be de-
nied a seat under almost any electoral
system. Otherwise, the main source
of deviation is the over-representation
of the Ulster Unionists in local seats
(though, with AV, these results reflect
the transfer of support from other un-
ionist parties). This result differs little
from that of a province-wide AV-Plus
election. The DV score is the same,
but the SDLP would gain one seat
fewer and the Ulster Unionists one
more in a province-wide contest. In
an election using three six-seater con-
stituencies, with one top-up seat each,
the DV score rises by ten percentage
points, chiefly because the Alliance
Party does not win a seat and Sinn
Fein get only two. The DUP and Ul-
ster Unionists gain one seat each from
these changes.
An alternative way of assessing the
results is to look at the outcomes by
blocs rather than by parties (Table 15).
This enables us to compute a ‘bloc’
DV score which compensates for the
presence of smaller parties, and to
suggest how legitimate the election
results are likely to seem. The Com-
mission’s two top-up area schema cuts
the projected DV score by more than
half to 4.6 per cent, by comparison
with a notional FPTP outcome (10.2
per cent), and a province-wide
scheme to 5.4 per cent. By contrast,
the three six-seater scheme yields a
DV score even higher than under
FPTP.
It is possible to re-run the 1997
elections in Northern Ireland under
an AMS equivalent of the Jenkins AV-
Plus scheme (i.e., using FPTP for the
local seat elections instead of AV).
(This cannot be done for AV-Plus it-
self because we have no useful data
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on voters’ second and subsequent
preferences.) With two top-up areas
of ten and eight seats (including two
top-up seats each), the exact equiva-
lent of the Commission’s AV-Plus
model, the outcomes for the national-
ist parties and unionists would be
more evenly distributed and the de-
viation from proportionality would be
far lower than in the actual election –
at 14.9 per cent as against 26.8 per
cent under FPTP. A province-wide
AMS scheme would give the nation-
alist parties three more seats than
Table 14: The 1998 Assembly election re-run under AV-Plus with a ten-seater and an
eight seater top-up areas each inc two top-up MPs
SDLP SF DUP UU APNI UKU PROG UDP CON Other Others NLP Total DV
union score
Local seats 4 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Top-up seats 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Seats under
AV-Plus 5 3 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
% Votes
shares 22 17.6 17.8 21.3 6.5 4.5 2.5 1.5 0.2 2.8 3.2 0.1 100
% Seat shares under
AV-Plus 27.8 16.7 16.7 33.3 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 17.9
Notes: SDLP=Social Democratic and Labour Party; SF Sinn Fein; DUP Democratic Unionist Party; UU Ulster Unionist Party; APNI
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland; UKU UK Unionist Party; PROG Progressive Unionist Party; UDP Ulster Democratic Party; CON
Conservative; Others includes the Workers Party, Women’s Coalition, independents; Other Union – includes all other unionist
parties; NLP Natural Law Party.
Table 15: Results of an AV Plus re-run of the 1998 Assembly Election by bloc
The Commission’s scheme (2 top-up areas with 2 top-up MPs each)
Nationalist bloc Non-aligned Unionist bloc Bloc DV
& other parties score
Seats under plurality rule 8 0 10
Seats under AV Plus 8 1 9
% vote share 39.6 9.6 49.6
% seats under plurality rule 44.4 0 55.6 10.2
% seats under AV-Plus 44.4 5.6 50 4.6
A province-wide scheme with four top-up seats
Seats under AV Plus 7 1 10
% seats under AV Plus 38.9 5.6 55.6 5.4
Three six seat top-up areas, each with one top-up MP
Seats under AV Plus 7 0 11
% seats under AV Plus 38.9 0 61.1 10.8
58 + The Politico’s Guide to Electoral Reform in Britain
FPTP, take three seats from the Ulster
Unionists, and allocate one seat to the
Alliance. Accordingly, it would be
even more proportional, at 10.5 per
cent. (Bear in mind in that 4 per cent
of the vote went to small parties which
may well not win seats under any con-
ceivable electoral system.) Assessed
on a bloc basis, both AMS schemes
would be far lower than the actual bloc
DV under FPTP in 1997 (21.5 per
cent), but the AMS equivalent to the
Commission’s two top-up area
scheme is, at 10.5 per cent, twice as
high as under the province-wide ver-
sion (4.2 per cent). The province-wide
scheme again represents the two main
blocs accurately and awards a seat to
the Alliance. The Alliance keeps its
seat under the two top-up area
scheme, but the balance between the
two main blocs tips back by two seats
towards the unionist side.
These results strongly suggest that
having four top-up seats makes an
important contribution to producing
more proportional outcomes. The
province-wide scheme, using either
FPTP or AV for the local seats, is
clearly more proportional than other
models, including the Commission’s
own, and always gives the Alliance a
seat, thereby broadening party repre-
sentation. However, province-wide
top-up MPs in Northern Ireland
would be more remote representatives
than in the rest of the country, and
given this consideration, the Commis-
sion scheme has enough to commend
it too. It ought not to be assumed, fi-
nally, that STV would produce more
proportional results. Given the size of
the votes for small parties, unlikely to
secure representation under STV, we
would expect its performance to be
worse than either AV-Plus schemes or
their AMS equivalents.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Jenkins Commission hasproduced a bold and in-genious solution to its difficult
brief . It has retained the much-prized
constituency links, but has nonethe-
less devised a way of securing some
parliamentary representation for the
vast majority of voters, wherever they
live in the country. The incentives for
voting will be strengthened, and vot-
ers will be more able to exercise
effective choices, both locally and at
the top-up area level.
The AV-Plus scheme is not fully
proportional and to the extent that it
is not, elections in Britain will con-
tinue to allocate seats to parties who
have not won them on their share of
the vote. But it will be significantly
more proportional, and more reliably
proportional over different kinds of
elections, than plurality rule. It will
spread representation. In 1997, it
would have given the Conservatives
eight seats in Scotland, six in Wales,
and 28 in the metropolitan areas of
England outside London – all zones
where they won no or almost no rep-
resentation under plurality rule.
Similarly, in 1992, Labour would have
gained 25 seats across south-east
England and East Anglia (instead of
six) and the Liberal Democrats 14
seats (instead of none).
In close elections, the new system
will be nearly proportional, and coa-
lition governments may result. In
years when the electorate has reached
a decisive view about the need for a
government change, AV-Plus will cut
back the unwon landslide parliamen-
tary majorities which voters dislike
and which make a mockery of the idea
of opposition in the Commons. But it
will still allow for single-party govern-
ments whenever a party gains around
44-45 per cent of the vote with a strong
lead over the second-placed party.
AV-Plus is well adapted to the con-
tours of British party politics since the
early 1970s when the current pattern
of alignments was first defined. In the
two 1974 elections, perhaps in 1979
and certainly in 1992, AV-Plus elec-
tions would have brought forth either
coalition governments, or minority
Conservative or Labour governments.
This may seem a radical change, but
under FPTP the two 1974 elections
produced first a minority Labour gov-
ernment, and then a marginal Labour
government which soon lost its small
overall majority. And though in 1992
John Major won a working majority
which lasted for five years, his own
intra-party coalition fragmented over
Europe, and the Conservatives only
enacted the Maastricht Treaty after
receiving crucial Parliamentary sup-
port from the Liberal Democrats. In
1983, 1987 and 1997, the Jenkins
scheme would certainly have pro-
60 + The Politico’s Guide to Electoral Reform in Britain
duced the same single-party govern-
ments, although with smaller overall
majorities and much stronger incen-
tives for the governments to pursue
policies which commanded a broad
level of public agreement.
Thus it is only 1979 which might
have been completely different under
AV-Plus, and we do not have suffi-
ciently good data on people’s second
preferences to be able to say whether
or not a Tory majority government
would have resulted.
In many ways, then, the Jenkins
scheme can claim to represent the
‘best of both worlds’. It creates the
stronger incentives for people to use
their votes which have meant that PR
elections in Europe generally have
much stronger levels of turnout than
in Britain. It prevents political parties
from developing strategies to appeal
only to a large minority of the elector-
ate, and it vitiates for ever the attempt
by people of many different ideologi-
cal persuasions to capture one of the
great British parties by organisational
means and then use its historical
weight to try and ‘bounce’ the elec-
torate into accepting unpopular
policies.
At the same time, the Commission
was alert to the danger that, in British
conditions, a fully- proportional sys-
tem could vest too much political
power in the hands of a large centrist
party, the Liberal Democrats – mak-
ing them a ‘hinge’ party that would
be required permanently for coalition
governments to be formed. By allow-
ing for single-party governments to
alternate with coalitions, Jenkins has
prevented the danger of ‘PR sclero-
sis’ in British government, and
retained incentives for bold and
broad-based popular leadership in the
Conservative and Labour parties to
seek overall command. British voters
will still have the ability to ‘throw the
rascals out’, but they will also escape
the danger of large artificial majori-
ties creating ‘electoral dictatorship’
and narrowly-based ‘strong’ govern-
ment being foisted on a public most
of whom have not voted for it.
The key to realising this balancing
trick was the decision to go for local
top-up areas with a limited quota of
top-up MPs. This bold move cuts
through the common aversion to elec-
toral systems which create the ‘flocks’
of list MPs, beholden only to party
managers and wheeling well above
local accountability. Instead, every
top-up MP will be selected for a local
area, often with an established histori-
cal identity, good public visibility, and
generally existing party organisations
capable of organising a democratic
selection process for these candidates.
In just over half the top-up areas, there
will be a single top-up MP, who will
always be the representative of the
main opposition party in areas where
one party is dominant. Where the
Conservatives and Labour more or
less share local seats evenly, the Lib-
eral Democrats, SNP or Plaid Cymru,
will win the top-up seat. In the 36 ar-
eas with two top-up seats, these third
or fourth parties will usually take one
of these extra places if they have not
already won a local seat.
None of these advantages means
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that the Jenkins proposals are ‘per-
fect’. No electoral scheme ever is. The
use of AV at local level is not good
news for the Conservatives. In 1997,
the Conservatives would still have
been badly under-represented, why is
why Lord Alexander’s minority report
argues the case for a FPTP local base
instead, and argues it well. An AMS
equivalent of AV-Plus would be more
proportional than AV-Plus itself. In
1997, it would have given the Tories
25 more seats, as it would specifically
work more proportionally in the hos-
tile conditions of 1997 (though not
necessarily so, say, when the Tories
are in the ascendant, as in 1983). It
would also be more consistent with
the AMS schemes intended for elec-
tions to the Scottish Parliament, and
Welsh and London assemblies, and
perhaps in local government elections
as well. Lastly, the FPTP element is
familiar and simple to use.
But an AMS scheme would also
have its drawbacks. It would not ex-
tend voters’ choices in constituency
elections, as AV (and the supplemen-
tary vote) would; and so it would
recreate tactical voting problems for
many voters. It would also mean that
many local MPs would continue to
take their seats on a minority of the
local vote.
Another alternative might be to
substitute the supplementary vote for
AV. SV-Plus would produce exactly
the same results in terms of seats and
government as AV-Plus, but the bal-
lot papers and counting would be
simpler. Arguments against ‘wacky’
second and subsequent preferences of
people voting for more marginal can-
didates, and the weight generally
given to such preferences, would not
be able to confuse the debate. Further,
SV is to be used for the election of
London mayors and any other may-
ors thereafter.
For smaller parties, like the Greens
or an anti-Europe party, it would be
hard to win seats under the Jenkins
formula, since the effective threshold
would be about 8 per cent of the top-
up vote in the largest areas where
their chances of winning would be
greatest. Where local seats are not in
practice proportionately allocated, or
top-up areas are smaller, the real
threshold may be as high as 11-12 per
cent. Such thresholds will be hard to
climb, but at least smaller parties now
have far more of an incentive to try
and build up support, and they will
be assisted by the use of AV in con-
stituency contests where people can
split their votes and give, say, a Green
candidate the nod with a first prefer-
ence vote.
Another virtue of the realism inher-
ent in the Jenkins package is the
space it leaves for recommendations
to evolve as the public debate on elec-
toral reform unfolds. This is
particularly true of the Commission’s
decision not to choose between the
three varying ratios of top-up to con-
stituency MPs, but to leave the final
choice to be debated further. Our
analysis shows that the 80:20 mix
would significantly improve the over-
all proportionality of the scheme
without substantially reducing the
strength of local representation or the
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chances of single-party governments
coming into power. The consequences
for any one party would be negligi-
ble. But adding a mere 15 extra top-up
MPs would reduce the number of top-
up areas with only one top-up MPs to
a minority (29 out of 80) and reduce
deviations from proportionality appre-
ciably in all kinds of electoral
conditions. It would systematically
strengthen the representation of un-
derdogs and reduce rather more the
over-representation of locally-domi-
nant parties.
A government commitment to an
80: 20 mix in the referendum on the
Jenkins proposals would be a sign of
a party in tune with the more diverse
politics of contemporary Britain. But
before that we require a commitment
to a referendum before the next elec-
tion.
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About the Democratic Audit
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of Liberty, by Francesca Klug, Keir
Starmer and Stuart Weir, published in
September 1996 (Routledge), audits
the protection of civil and political
rights in the United Kingdom.
The Democratic Audit is continu-
ing its inquiries into democracy and
political freedom throughout the pe-
riod of this government. The intention
is to follow up these two “benchmark”
studies at regular intervals, so that the
quality of democracy and political
freedoms in the UK can be measured
over time. The current plan is to pub-
lish the first follow-up report at the
end of this Labour government’s term
in office.
The Democratic Audit has pub-
lished ground-breaking reports on
quangos in the UK and cooperated
with Channel 4 Despatches on a docu-
mentary on advisory quangos, Behind
Closed Doors.  The Audit undertakes
consultancy and educational work in
the UK and abroad, and organises in-
ternational courses and seminars on
democracy and freedom.
The Audit is based at the Human
Rights Centre, University of Essex,
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ and is
sponsored by the Joseph Rowntree
Charitable Trust. You can find out
more about the Audit by writing to:
The Democratic Audit,
PO Box 18000,
London N1 7WW.
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The map
The pocket in the back cover oppo-
site contains a map, showing the 80
top-up areas which would be estab-
lished in the UK under the Electoral
Commission’s AV-Plus scheme. Top-
up areas may have one or two top-up
MPs.
The map also shows how many
seats the parties would have won in
these areas in 1997 under the Com-
mission’s ‘middle’ scheme, split
82.5:17.5 between constituency and
top-up MPs. Two other schemes, with
a mix of 80: 20 and 85: 15, are also
put forward for debate. The index
shows the number of seats which each
party would hold in each area. The
coloured areas indicate that a particu-
lar party would hold more than half
the seats in the area (i.e., local and
top-up seats). In 1997, Labour would
have won over half the seats in 47 ar-
eas (coloured red); the Conservatives
would have a similar majority in five
areas (blue) and the Liberal Demo-
crats in three (yellow). In the rest of
the country (grey), no one party would
be dominant.
